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Abstract
We develop a human capital model with borrowing constraints explicitly derived from
government student loan programs and private lending under limited commitment. Two key
implications of our analysis are: (i) binding constraints may not depress investment; and
(ii) a positive relationship between investment and ability is unlikely to arise in standard
exogenous constraint models but arises more generally in our framework. Our model also
helps explain a number of important empirical observations in the U.S. higher education
sector since the early 1980s: (i) a strong and stable positive correlation between ability
and college attendance for all income and wealth backgrounds; (ii) the rising importance
of family income as a determinant of college attendance; (iii) the increase in the share of
undergraduates borrowing the maximum from government student loan programs; and (iv)
the dramatic rise in student borrowing from private lenders. In our framework, all of these
are natural responses to the rising costs and returns to college (with stable real government
loan limits) observed in recent decades. In contrast, the standard exogenous constraint
model cannot simultaneously explain observations (i) and (ii) under standard assumptions
about preferences; it is also silent on the rise in private lending. Finally, by incorporating
both public and private lending, our framework offers new insights regarding the interaction
of government and private student lending as well as the responsiveness of private student
credit to economic and policy changes.
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1 Introduction
The human capital literature has consistently appealed to credit constraints to explain differences
in schooling investments by family income.1 The literature, however, has paid little attention to
the nature of those constraints, i.e. the underlying institutions and incentive problems associated
with providing credit to young individuals with little collateral to pledge while in school.2 Instead,
nearly all studies of human capital with imperfect credit markets assume that individuals face an
arbitrary exogenous limit on borrowing (or arbitrary differences in interest rates based on family
income).3 Such simple assumptions are at odds with the actual operation of public and private
sources of credit for education. Existing government student loan (GSL) programs explicitly link
credit to educational expenditures, while private lenders extend credit to students based on their
prospects of repayment and projected future earnings.
In this paper, we model schooling investment decisions when access to credit is determined by
key features of public and private lending. We incorporate the fact that credit from GSL programs
is restricted by a pre-specified upper limit and a ‘tied-to-investment’ constraint that does not allow
borrowing to exceed educational expenditures (net of any grants or subsidies). To model private
lending, we build on recent work on credit constraints that arise endogenously when lenders have
limited mechanisms for enforcing repayment, a natural assumption given the inalienability of
human capital.4 Under standard enforcement mechanisms, the costs of default are higher for
individuals with greater earnings capacity. As a result, private lenders are willing to extend more
credit to individuals that invest more in their skills and/or exhibit higher ability. Altogether,
access to credit in our model is explicitly linked to schooling expenditures and observable factors
that affect the expected future earnings of borrowers.
Relative to a standard model with exogenous constraints, our framework provides new and
empirically relevant insights on the effects of ability and family resources on schooling decisions.
Incorporating the endogenous nature of credit restrictions fundamentally changes the intertem-
poral trade-off that defines human capital investments. Ability has stronger positive effects on
education investments, and schooling is more sensitive to government policies. Calibrating our
1Becker’s seminal Woytinsky Lecture (1967) provides an important early theoretical treatment of human capital
investment when borrowing opportunities are limited. Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) represents an early empirical
analysis of educational attainment gaps by family income; although, their primary focus is on the redistributive ef-
fects of education subsidies. Manski and Wise (1983) emphasize borrowing constraints specifically as an explanation
for their estimated family income – schooling gaps.
2Notable recent exceptions include Andolfatto and Gervais (2006), who focus on optimal intergenerational
transfers (in the form of social security and education subsidies) under limited commitment and Ionescu (2008,
2009), who studies default in federal student loan programs.
3Studies assuming variable or heterogeneous interest rates include Becker (1975), Cameron and Taber (2004)
and Card (1995). Studies assuming a fixed limit on borrowing include Belley and Lochner (2007), Caucutt and
Kumar (2003), Cordoba and Ripoll (2009), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), and Keane and Wolpin (2001).
4The literature on endogenous credit constraints has mostly focused on risk-sharing and asset prices in en-
dowment economies (e.g. Alvarez and Jermann 2000, Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger 2004, Krueger and Perri
2002, Kehoe and Levine 1993, and Kocherlakota 1996) or firm dynamics (e.g. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 2004,
Monge-Naranjo 2009). Our punishments for default are similar to those in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007)
and Chatterjee, et al. (2007) in their analyses of bankruptcy.
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model to the U.S. economy, we show that it can explain the rising importance of family resources
for college attendance and the dramatic rise in private student borrowing observed over the past
few decades as natural responses to the well-documented increases in the costs of and returns to
college.
We highlight two important cross-sectional implications of our model. First, credit constrained
individuals do not necessarily under-invest in human capital. When private loans are unavailable,
students constrained only by the GSL’s ‘tied-to-investment’ constraint always invest the uncon-
strained optimal amount. When both public and private loans are available, poor low ability youth
may actually over-invest in human capital.5 In either case, investment in human capital is no less
than the unrestricted amount and is non-decreasing in family wealth. These results are important
in light of the countless empirical studies that are based on the premise (from exogenous constraint
models) that borrowing constraints always reduce investment.
Second, our model better predicts the observed ability – college attendance relationship com-
pared to the standard model. We show that under empirically plausible assumptions about the
consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), exogenous constraint models predict
a negative relationship between investment and ability among constrained students.6 This is
strongly at odds with empirical studies, which universally indicate that cognitive ability has a
strong positive effect on schooling.7 Our model performs much better. The link between credit
and ability and schooling in our model implies a positive education – ability relationship under
empirically relevant assumptions.
Our model quantitatively accounts for a number of major changes in college attendance and
borrowing patterns in the U.S. between the early 1980s and the early 2000s. In particular, we show
that the model is consistent with four facts: (1) a positive ability – education relationship for all
family income groups over time (see Section 3); (2) the increased importance of family income as
a determinant of college attendance from the early 1980s to the 2000s (Belley and Lochner 2007);
(3) a sharp increase in the fraction of undergraduates borrowing the maximum available from GSL
programs since the early 1990s (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002); and (4) a sharp increase in the
students borrowing from private lenders since the mid-1990s (College Board 2005). Calibrating our
model to the U.S. in the early 1980s, we show that these changes can be explained as equilibrium
responses to the observed increase in the returns to and costs of college since the early 1980s (and
stable GSL limits).
Our results suggest that in the early 1980s, the GSL provided adequate credit so that few stu-
5Over-investment — investing so much that the marginal return is below the (financial) marginal cost — can
arise as a way to increase consumption during school. When only the tied-to-investment constraint binds, additional
investments (at the margin) can be financed fully from the GSL, and increases in investment expand private credit
that can be used to enhance current consumption. While over-investment is theoretically possible, our quantitative
analysis indicates that it is not empirically relevant given relatively low current GSL limits.
6Specifically, we show that for an IES ≤ 1 investment is decreasing in ability for constrained borrowers; however,
most estimates of the IES are less than one (Browning, Hansen and Heckman 1999).
7For example, see Cameron and Heckman (1998), Carneiro and Heckman 2002), Belley and Lochner (2007), as
well as evidence provided in Section 3.
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dents would have needed to turn to private creditors. College attendance was strongly increasing
in ability and largely independent of family resources. The rising college costs and returns over
time have encouraged more recent students to invest and borrow more, with many exhausting
their GSL loans and borrowing substantially from private lenders. Although private lenders have
responded to increases in schooling by offering more credit, our results suggest that many stu-
dents with low family resources are now constrained and unable to invest as much as they would
like. Our simulations imply a weaker ability – investment relationship for constrained youth than
ability – college attendance patterns in the 1997 Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY97) would suggest. However, our model performs noticeably better than the current
alternative in this regard: the exogenous constraint model predicts a negative ability – schooling
relationship at the bottom of the family income/wealth distribution where youth are most con-
strained. Additionally, the exogenous constraint model offers little insight regarding the significant
changes in the composition of student borrowing; although, it generically predicts an increase in
total borrowing and in the fraction constrained.
We analyze a number of policy issues that cannot be studied without explicitly endogeneizing
access to credit. For instance, our framework lends itself naturally to an analysis of the interaction
between GSL and private credit as well as the response of private credit to government policies. We
simulate the effects of changes in the GSL program (upper loan limits and repayment schedules)
and to private loan enforcement regulations. Most interestingly, we show that expansions of public
credit do not fully crowd out private lending: increases in GSL limits lead to higher levels of total
credit and raise human capital investment among youth constrained by those limits. Additionally,
we show that changes in GSL credit tend to have a relatively greater impact on investment among
the least able, while changes in private loan enforcement tend to impact investment more among
the most able. Clearly, not all credit expansions are equivalent.
Finally, endogenous borrowing constraints make human capital investment more sensitive to
government education subsidies. Any policy that encourages investment is met with an increase
in access to credit, which further encourages the investment of constrained students. This ‘credit
expansion effect’, absent with fixed constraints, can be quite large. In our quantitative analysis,
investment responds as much as 50% more than in the exogenous constraint model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the existing sources of credit in
the U.S. Section 3 reports U.S. evidence on the relationship between ability, family income, and
college attendance. Section 4 uses a general two-period model to analytically compare the cross-
sectional implications for borrowing and investment under alternative assumptions about credit
markets. Section 5 extends our framework to a multi-period life-cycle and presents our calibration
and baseline quantitative analysis. Section 6 simulates the effects of increased returns and costs
to college as observed from the early 1980s to early 2000s. This section also contains a number of
policy experiments. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 Available Sources of Credit
In this section, we briefly review the main sources of credit in the U.S. for college education,
including government and private student loans.
2.1 Government Student Loan Programs
Federal GSL programs are an important source of finance for higher education in the U.S., ac-
counting for 71% of the federal student aid disbursed in 2003-04. The largest program is the
Stafford Loan program, which awarded nearly $50 billion to students in the 2003-04 academic
year.8 A second program, the Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS), awarded $7
billion to parents of undergraduate students during the same period. Also, on a much smaller
scale, the Perkins Loan program disbursed $1.6 billion to a small fraction of students from very
low-income families.9
GSL programs generally have three important features. First, lending is directly tied to in-
vestment. Students (or parents) can only borrow up to the total cost of college (including tuition,
room, board, books, supplies, transportation, computers, and other expenses directly related to
schooling) less any other financial aid they receive in the form of grants or scholarships. Thus,
GSL programs do not finance non-schooling consumption expenses. Second, GSL programs set
cumulative and annual upper loan limits on the total amount of credit available for each student.10
Third, loans covered by GSL programs typically have extended enforcement rules compared to
unsecured private loans.
Table 1 reports loan limits (based on the dependency status and class of the student) for
Stafford and Perkins programs for the period 1993-2007. Dependent students could borrow up to
$23,000 from the Stafford Loan Program over the course of their undergraduate careers. Indepen-
dent students could borrow roughly twice that amount, although most traditional undergraduates
do not fall into this category. Qualified undergraduates from low income families could receive as
much as $20,000 in Perkins loans, depending on their need and post-secondary institution. It is
important to note, however, that amounts offered through this program have typically been less
than mandated limits.11 Student borrowers can defer loan re-payments until six (Stafford) to nine
(Perkins) months after leaving school.
8The Stafford program offers both subsidized and unsubsidized loans, with the latter available to all students
and the former only to students demonstrating financial need. The government waives the interest on subsidized
loans while students are enrolled; it does not do so for unsubsidized loans. Prior to the introduction of unsubsidized
Stafford Loans in the early 1990s, Supplemental Loans to Students (SLS) were an alternative source of unsubsidized
federal loans for independent students.
9See The College Board (2006) for details about financial aid disbursements and their trends over time.
10Since 1993-94, the PLUS loan program no longer has a fixed maximum borrowing limit; however, parents still
cannot borrow more than the total cost of college net of other financial aid.
11Parents that do not have an adverse credit rating can borrow up to the cost of schooling from the PLUS
program, with repayment typically beginning within 60 days of loan disbursement. Dependent students whose
parents do not qualify for PLUS loans (due to a bad credit rating) are able to borrow up to the independent
student loan limits.
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Table 1: Borrowing Limits for Stafford and Perkins Student Loan Programs (1993-2007)
Stafford Loans
Dependent Independent
Students Students∗ Perkins Loans
Eligibility Requirements Subsidized: Financial Need Financial Need
Unsubsidized: All Students
Undergraduate Limits:
First Year $2,625 $6,625 $4,000
Second Year $3,500 $7,500 $4,000
Third-Fifth Years $4,000 $8,000 $4,000
Cum. Total $23,000 $46,000 $20,000
Graduate Limits:
Annual $18,500 $6,000
Cum. Total∗∗ $138,500 $40,000
Notes:
∗ Students whose parents do not qualify for PLUS loans can borrow up to
independent student limits from Stafford program.
∗∗ Cumulative graduate loan limits include loans from undergraduate loans.
Cumulative Stafford Loan limits, in real terms, were nearly identical in 2002-03 to what they
were twenty years earlier. (We focus on these years since the individuals we study below from
the 1979 and 1997 Cohorts of the National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth, NLSY79 and NLSY97
respectively, made their college attendance decisions around these two periods.) While the gov-
ernment nominally increased loan limits (especially for upper-year college students) in 1986-87
and 1993-94, inflation has otherwise eroded these limits away.12 The relative stability of real GSL
limits combined with a near doubling of tuition costs in recent decades (College Board 2005),
has pushed recent student borrowing up against these upper limits for many undergraduates.
Indeed, the fraction of all undergraduate borrowers that borrowed the maximum limit from the
federal Stafford Student Loan Program nearly tripled from only 18% in 1989-90 to 52% in 1999-
2000. Among traditional dependent undergraduates, the fraction increases to nearly 70% of all
borrowers in 1999-2000 (Berkner 2000 and Titus 2002).
An important aspect of GSL loans is that they are more strictly enforced relative to typical
unsecured private loans. Except in very special circumstances, these loans cannot be expunged
through bankruptcy. If a suitable re-payment plan is not agreed upon with the lender once a
12From 1982-83 to 2002-03, Stafford borrowing limits for undergraduates declined by 44% for first-year students
and 25% for second-year students, while they increased by about 20% for college students enrolled in years three
through five. For most of this period, loan limits for independent undergraduates remained about twice the amounts
available to dependent students. Stafford loan limits for graduate students declined by about 35% in real terms
from 1986–87 to 2006–07, roughly the time NLSY97 respondents would have began attending graduate school.
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borrower enters default, the default status will be reported to credit bureaus and collection costs
(up to 25% of the balance due) may be added to the amount outstanding.13 Up to 15% of the
borrower’s wages can also be garnisheed. Moreover, federal tax refunds can be seized and applied
toward any outstanding balance. Other sanctions include a possible hold on college transcripts,
ineligibility for further federal student loans, and ineligibility for future deferments or forbearances.
2.2 Private Lending
Historically, private financing of higher education has been relatively uncommon and mostly re-
stricted to students at elite institutions or those enrolled in professional schools (e.g. business, law
and medicine), whose post-graduation earnings (and ability to repay) are expected to be high. As
late as the mid-1990s, few private lenders offered loans to students outside the GSL programs (e.g.
in 1995-96, total non-federal student loans amounted to only $1.3 billion).
But, much has changed since then. By 2004-05, the amount of student borrowing from pri-
vate lenders had risen to almost $14 billion, which was nearly 20% of all student loan dollars
distributed. Even if private loans are most prevalent among graduate students (especially in pro-
fessional schools) and undergraduates at high-cost private universities (Wegmann, Cunningham
and Merisotis 2003), the rise in borrowing from private student lenders outside the Stafford and
Perkins Loan Programs indicates that the GSL limits are no longer enough to satisfy many stu-
dents’ demands for credit.14 The rising importance of private lending is even more pronounced
than these figures suggest, since they do not include student borrowing on credit cards, which also
increased considerably over this period (see College Board 2005).
As we show below, the design of private lending programs is broadly consistent with the problem
of lending under limited repayment incentives. Private lenders directly link credit to educational
investment expenditures and indirectly to projected earnings. All private student loan programs
require evidence of post-secondary school enrollment, offering students credit far in excess of what
is otherwise offered in the form of more traditional uncollateralized loans. While many private
student lending programs are loosely structured like federal GSL programs, they vary substantially
in their terms and eligibility requirements. Most notably, some private lenders clearly advertise
that they consider the school attended, course of study, and the grades of students in determining
loan packages.15 Finally, private lenders seem to react quickly to changes in economic conditions
that affect the broader credit market and the ability of students to meet their future repayment
obligations. The New York Times (Glater 2008) reports that in response to the recent credit crisis
13Formally, a borrower is considered to be in default once a payment is 270 days late.
14Private student loans generally charge higher interest rates than Stafford or Perkins loans and are, therefore,
typically taken after exhausting available credit from GSL programs.
15For example, MyRichUncle states on its website (www.myrichuncle.com) that it “believes that success in school
is indicative of your willingness and ability to repay your loans...taking into account your GPA, school, and course
of study.” The financial aid help website Finaid.org discusses the growing practice of peer-to-peer student lending,
which lets students “...provide some background information on why they need the money. Often this information
is structured, providing information about the degree program, year in school, name of the college and GPA.”
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in the U.S., a number of private lenders discontinued lending to students at community colleges
and lower quality four-year institutions, while they continued to lend to students at higher quality
schools where graduates were expected to earn more after school.
Until very recently, enforcement of private student loans was regulated by U.S. bankruptcy
code. In filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, former students could discharge all private student
loan obligations after leaving school.16 Court and filing fees amounting to as much as a couple
thousand dollars must also be paid. Other less explicit costs associated with bankruptcy filing are
also likely to be important. For example, bankruptcy shows up on an individual’s credit report
for ten years, limiting future access to credit. Bankruptcy may spill over into other domains as
well (e.g. banks, mortgage companies, landlords, and employers often request credit reports from
potential customers or employees). Finally, U.S. bankruptcy requires “good faith” attempts to
meet debt obligations, which may make it difficult for former students to expunge their debts
if current income levels are high. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007) argue that punishments
associated with Chapter 7 bankruptcy are well-approximated by a temporary period of both wage
garnishments and exclusion from credit markets. We follow their approach below.
3 Ability, Family Resources, and College Attendance
The empirical literature on borrowing constraints and human capital has largely focused on the
relationship between family income and college attendance. Recent studies also consider the
importance of cognitive ability in determining schooling outcomes. In this section, we discuss the
empirical relationship between family income, cognitive ability, and college attendance in the U.S.
during the early 1980s and in the early 2000s. We document two important facts using data from
the NLSY79 and NLSY97. First, in both the early 1980s and the early 2000s, there is a strong
positive relationship between college attendance and cognitive ability or achievement (as measured
by scores on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test, AFQT) for youth from all levels of family income
and wealth.17 Second, for recent student cohorts, there is a much stronger relationship between
family income (or wealth) and college attendance. Indeed, in the early 1980s, there was a only
weak link between family income and college-going.
Using data for the 1980s (NLSY79), a number of empirical studies have found that family
income played little role in college attendance decisions. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999) find
that after controlling for family background, AFQT scores, and unobserved heterogeneity, family
income has little effect on college enrollment rates. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also estimate
16More generally, borrowers filing under Chapter 7 must surrender any non-collateralized assets (above an ex-
emption) in exchange for discharging all debts; however, most school-leavers considering bankruptcy have few if
any assets. Since the ‘Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005’, individuals can no
longer discharge student loans, public or private, through bankruptcy.
17AFQT scores are widely used as measures of cognitive achievement by social scientists and are strongly corre-
lated with post-school earnings conditional on educational attainment. See, e.g., Cawley, et al. (2000). Appendix A
provides additional details on the AFQT.
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small differences in college enrollment rates and other college-going outcomes by family income
after accounting for differences in family background and AFQT. Cameron and Taber (2004) and
Keane and Wolpin (2001) explore different features of the NLSY79 data and also argue that credit
constraints had little effect on educational outcomes in the early 1980s.
Using data for the late 1990s and early 2000s (NLSY97), Belley and Lochner (2007) show
that family income has become a much more important determinant of college attendance.18
Youth from high income families in the NLSY97 are 16 percentage points more likely to attend
college than are youth from low income families, conditional on AFQT scores, family composition,
parental age and education, race/ethnicity, and urban/rural residence. This is roughly twice
the effect observed in the NLSY79. The NLSY79 do not contain data on wealth; however, the
combined effect of family income and wealth in the NLSY97 are substantially greater than the
effects of income alone. Comparing youth from the highest family income and wealth quartiles to
those from the lowest quartiles yields an estimated difference in college attendance rates of nearly
30 percentage points after controlling for ability and family background.
Despite changes in the relationship between family resources and college attendance, the re-
lationship between ability and schooling has remained strong over time. Figure 1 shows college
attendance rates by AFQT quartiles and either family income or family wealth quartiles in the
NLSY79 and NLSY97.19 For all family resource levels in both NLSY samples, we observe sub-
stantial increases in college attendance with AFQT. The differences in attendance rates between
the highest and lowest ability quartiles range from 47% to 68% depending on the family income
or wealth quartile. The figure reveals an equally strong positive ability – college attendance re-
lationship for youth from low and high income/wealth families. In the NLSY97 data, the college
attendance gap between the highest and lowest ability quartiles from both the lowest family in-
come and wealth quartiles is 47%, compared to a 37% gap for those from both the highest family
income and wealth quartiles.20
Of course, AFQT scores may be correlated with other family background variables that influ-
ence college attendance decisions conditional on family resources. In Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2008), we use the NLSY79 and NLSY97 to estimate the effects of AFQT on college attendance by
family income or wealth quartile after controlling for gender, race/ethnicity, mother’s education,
18Ellwood and Kane (2000) argue that college attendance differences by family income were already becoming
more important by the early 1990s. Using data on youth of college-ages in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (from
the Health and Retirement Survey), Brown, Seshadri, and Scholz (2007) estimate that borrowing constraints limit
college-going; however, they do not examine whether constraints have become more limiting in recent years. While
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2007) find little effect of borrowing constraints (defined by the self-reported desire
to borrow more for school) on overall college dropout rates for a recent cohort of students at Berea College, they
find substantial differences in dropout rates between those who are constrained and those who are not. They do
not study the effects of borrowing constraints on attendance.
19See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data and variables used here.
20We observe similar patterns in the NLSY97 for age 20 enrollment in four-year colleges/universities conditional
on attendance at any post-secondary institution. Among youth from the lowest wealth quartile, the enrollment
rate in four-year schools (conditional on post-secondary enrollment) is 34% higher for the most able relative to the
least able. Among the highest wealth quartile, the difference is 32%. For the lowest family income quartile, the
same high - low ability gap is 41%, while it is 52% for the highest income quartile.
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Figure 1: College Attendance by AFQT and Family Income or Wealth (NLSY79 and NLSY97)
(b) Attendance by AFQT and Family Income (NLSY97)
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intact family during adolescence, number of siblings/children under age 18, mother’s age at child’s
birth, urban/metropolitan area of residence during adolescence, and year of birth. These estimates
confirm the general patterns observed in Figure 1: Cognitive ability has strong positive effects on
college attendance for all family income and wealth quartiles in both NLSY samples. Below, we
demonstrate that these findings are strongly at odds with the predictions of a standard exogenous
constraints model.
4 Modeling Student Credit
As discussed in Section 2, both public and private student lenders behave quite differently from
the standard assumption that credit is limited by a single invariant upper limit. Most importantly,
they link credit to the investment and ability of the borrower. In this section, we use a two-period
model to show how this link shapes the behavior of human capital investment. Incorporating key
features of public and private lending yields predictions about cross-sectional investment patterns
that are qualitatively consistent with the empirical patterns discussed above, while the standard
model of exogenous borrowing constraints does not.
4.1 Preferences and Human Capital Production Technology
Consider two-period-lived individuals who invest in schooling in the first period and work in the
second. Their preferences are
U = u (c0) + βu (c1) , (1)
where ct is consumption in periods t ∈ {0, 1}, β > 0 is a discount factor, and u (·) is the pe-
riod utility function. We assume u (·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
differentiable and satisfies limc↘0 u′ (c) = +∞.
Each individual is endowed with financial assets w ≥ 0 and ability a > 0. Initial assets capture
all familial transfers while ability reflects innate factors, early parental investments and other char-
acteristics that shape the returns to investing in schooling. We take (w, a) as fixed and exogenous
to focus on schooling decisions that individuals make largely on their own; however, our central
results generalize naturally to an intergenerational environment in which parents endogenously
make transfers to their children.21
Labor earnings at t = 1 are equal to af (h), where h is schooling investment and f (·) is
a positive, strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable function that
satisfies limh↘0 f ′ (h) = +∞ and limh↗∞ f ′ (h) = 0. Note that both a and h increase earnings
21In an online appendix, we derive equivalent analytical results in three common models of parental transfers:
(i) an ‘altruistic’ model (i.e. parents directly value the utility of their children); (ii) ‘warm glow’ preferences (i.e.
parents directly value the resources transferred to their children); and (iii) a ‘paternalistic’ model (i.e. parents
directly value the human capital investment of their children). In the last model, we need to impose a few
additional mild conditions.
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and are complementary with each other.22
Human capital investment, h, is in units of the consumption good.23 Individuals can borrow d
of these units (or save, in which case d < 0) at a gross interest rate R > 1. Given w, a, h and d,
consumption in each of the periods is
c0 = w + d− h, (2)
c1 = af (h)−Rd. (3)
4.2 Unrestricted Allocations
Young individuals maximize utility (1) subject to (2) and (3). In the absence of financial frictions,
this maximization can be separated into two steps. The first is to choose human capital investment
h to maximize the present value of net lifetime income, −h+af (h) /R, which leads to the condition
af ′
[
hU (a)
]
= R. (4)
Optimal unrestricted investment, hU (a), equates the marginal return on human capital with the
return on financial assets and is, therefore, strictly increasing in ability, a, and independent of
initial assets, w.
The second step is to smooth consumption, i.e. borrow dU (a, w) units to satisfy the Euler
equation:
u′
(
w + dU (a, w)− hU (a)) = βRu′ (af [hU (a)]−RdU (a, w)) . (5)
Unconstrained borrowing is strictly decreasing in wealth and increasing in ability. Ability increases
borrowing for two different reasons: (i) more able individuals wish to finance a larger investment
and (ii) for any given level of investment, more able individuals earn higher net lifetime income
and wish to consume more in the first period. Because of (ii), unrestricted borrowing increases
more steeply in ability than does unrestricted human capital investment. The following lemma
formalizes this result and is used below to determine who is credit constrained.
Lemma 1 hU(a) is strictly increasing in a, and dU (a, w) is strictly increasing in a and strictly
decreasing in w. Moreover, ∂d
U (a,w)
∂a
> dh
U (a)
∂a
> 0 and −1 < ∂dU (a,w)
∂w
< 0.
See Appendix B for all proofs and other analytical details related to this section.
22We implicitly assume a constant elasticity of substitution between ability and investment equal to one. This
specification is consistent with most empirical studies, which generally incorporate ability in the intercept of log
wage/earnings regressions and with standard theoretical models of human capital (e.g. the widely used Ben-Porath
(1967) model). In an online appendix, we generalize a few key results below to the more general case of a CES
production function in both ability and human capital, f˜(a, h).
23Our model is isomorphic to one in which foregone earnings for any given investment amount, h, are independent
of ability. In an online appendix, we extend our model to allow the cost of investment to depend generally on ability.
We show that our main conclusions here hold under fairly general and empirically relevant assumptions.
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4.3 Exogenous Borrowing Constraints
Credit constraints are typically introduced in models of human capital by imposing a fixed and
exogenous upper bound on the amount of debt.24 Following this approach, assume that borrowing
is restricted by the exogenous constraint:
d ≤ d0, (EXC)
where 0 ≤ d0 <∞ is fixed and uniform for all agents. We use the superscript X for allocations in
this model.
For each ability a, a threshold level of assets wXmin (a) defines who is constrained (w < w
X
min (a))
and who is unconstrained (w ≥ wXmin (a)). Constrained persons have high ability relative to their
wealth since wXmin (a) is increasing in ability (see Appendix B). Individuals constrained by (EXC)
have exhausted their possibilities to bring future resources to the early (investment) period. Their
human capital investment hX (a, w) must strike a balance between increasing lifetime earnings and
smoothing consumption and is uniquely determined by
u′
(
w + d0 − hX (a, w)
)
= βu′
(
af
[
hX (a, w)
]−Rd0af ′ [hX (a, w)]) ,
the equality between the marginal cost of investing (reducing current consumption) and its marginal
benefit (net return in terms of future consumption).
The next proposition highlights four empirically relevant implications of this model. Most
importantly, the implied relationship between constrained investment and ability in part (iv)
depends on the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), −u′ (c) / [cu′′ (c)].
Proposition 1 Consider individuals with wealth w < wXmin(a), so (EXC) binds. Then: (i)
hX (a, w) < hU (a); (ii) hX (a, w) is strictly increasing in w; (iii) the marginal return on hu-
man capital investment, af ′
[
hX(a, w)
]
, is strictly greater than R and strictly decreasing in w; and
(iv) if the IES ≤ 1, then hX (a, w) is strictly decreasing in ability, a.
Results (i)-(iii) are well-known (Becker 1975) and central to the empirical literature on credit
constraints. For instance, Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999), Ellwood and Kane (2000), Carneiro
and Heckman (2002), and Belley and Lochner (2007) empirically examine if youth from lower in-
come families acquire less schooling conditional on family background and ability (results (i) and
(ii)). Lang (1993), Card (1995), and Cameron and Taber (2004) explore the prediction that the
marginal return on human capital investment exceeds the return on financial assets (result (iii)).
The most interesting result is part (iv). The relationship between ability and investment
for constrained individuals is determined by the balance of two opposing forces. On the one
24See, for example, Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Seshadri (2002), Belley and Lochner (2007), Caucutt and Kumar
(2003), Cordoba and Ripoll (2009), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2003), and Keane and Wolpin (2001). Instead,
Becker (1975) assumes that individuals face an increasing interest rate schedule as a function of their investment.
Becker’s formulation yields similar predictions to those discussed here.
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hand, there is an intertemporal substitution effect: more able individuals earn a higher return
on human capital investment, so they would like to invest more. On the other hand, there is a
wealth effect: more able individuals have higher lifetime earnings, which increases their desired
consumption at all ages. Since constrained borrowers can only increase consumption during the
initial period by investing less, the wealth effect discourages investment. With strong preferences
for intertemporal consumption smoothing (i.e. IES≤1), the wealth effect dominates and a negative
ability – investment relationship arises.
The prediction of a negative relationship between ability and investment for an IES ≤ 1 is a
serious shortcoming of the model.25 Most estimates of the IES are less than one (see Browning,
Hansen, Heckman 1999) and as discussed earlier, schooling is strongly increasing in ability even for
youth from low-income families. Result (iv) not only implies perverse cross-sectional investment
patterns, but it also implies that an increase in the market price of human capital can lead to
aggregate reductions in investment among constrained individuals. This is because a change in
the price of skill is analogous to increasing the ability of everyone in the economy.
4.4 Government Student Loan Programs
In this subsection, we consider GSL programs as the only source of credit. We then introduce
private lending in the following subsection.
As described in Section 2, GSL programs possess three key features. First, lending is tied to
investment and cannot be used to finance non-schooling related consumption goods or activities:
d ≤ h. (TIC)
This condition is equivalent to c0 ≤ w. Second, borrowing is constrained by a fixed upper limit
0 < dmax <∞, so
d ≤ dmax. (6)
Combining these two constraints yields actual credit limits from GSL programs:
d ≤ min {h, dmax} . (GSLC)
Third, the government has enhanced enforcement mechanisms to ensure repayment. To capture
this feature, we assume that government loans are fully enforceable (an assumption implicit also
in the previous model.)
To isolate the role of (TIC), first assume that it is the only constraint.26 In this case, individ-
uals are unconstrained as long as desired borrowing is less than or equal to desired investment.
Because desired investment is increasing in ability, the (TIC) constraint is less stringent than
25An IES ≤ 1 is only a sufficient condition. We further show in the online appendix that the result is even
stronger if investment is in terms of foregone earnings that increase with ability.
26This would be the case if upper borrowing limits were non-existent or set very high (e.g. PLUS program for
students’ parents).
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(EXC) for higher ability individuals but more stringent for those with low ability. When d = h,
borrowing can finance investment (but no more), and early consumption equals initial wealth. The
individual’s problem reduces to choosing investment h to maximize {u (w) + βu [af (h)−Rh]},
which is equivalent to maximizing discounted net lifetime earnings. Therefore, optimal investment
equals hU(a).
By itself, (TIC) does not lead to a conflict between smoothing consumption and maximizing
net lifetime resources, because credit cannot be used for anything other than investment. Despite
potentially large distortions in the intertemporal allocation of consumption, if (TIC) were the
only constraint on borrowing, everyone would invest the unconstrained amount hU(a) regardless
of ability and initial wealth. Empirical tests based on investment differences by family resources
would fail to capture consumption distortions and would always conclude that borrowing con-
straints are non-binding or non-existent. A simple lesson is that robust empirical tests for binding
credit constraints should include information on the behavior of consumption over time.
Now, consider the full GSL constraint (GSLC), denoting allocations in this model by the
superscript G. To facilitate the exposition, we assume (throughout this section) that dmax = d0.
Unconstrained individuals (w ≥ wGmin(a)) possess relatively high assets relative to their ability.27
The remaining population of constrained individuals falls into three categories: First, a low ability
group is comprised of individuals constrained only by (TIC) and not by the maximum dmax. They
invest the unrestricted level hU(a) but would like to borrow to increase consumption while in
school. Second, a more able group consists of individuals who borrow up to the maximum dmax
and invest beyond that using some of their own available resources. For them, investment coincides
with hX(a, w). A third group might emerge if hX (a, w) is decreasing in a (i.e. IES ≤ 1.) This
third group would be composed of very high ability youth who are constrained by both (6) and
(TIC). We formalize this discussion as follows:
Proposition 2 Assume that u (·) has IES ≤ 1. Let dmax = d0 > 0; let a¯ > 0 be defined by
hU(a¯) = dmax; and let wˆ : [a¯,∞) → R+ be defined by hX [a, wˆ (a)] = dmax, the (possibly infinite)
wealth level that leads an exogenously constrained individual with ability a to invest dmax. Then:
hG(a, w) =

hU(a) a ≤ a¯ or w ≥ wXmin(a)
hX(a, w) a > a¯ and w < wˆ (a)
dmax otherwise.
Figures 2(a) and (b) illustrate the behavior of hG(a, w), hX(a, w), and hU(a) for the empirically
relevant case of IES ≤ 1. These figures also display unconstrained borrowing as a function of ability
for different levels of wealth. Figure 2(a) displays investment and borrowing behavior for two low
levels of wealth, w¯ and wL < w¯, while Figure 2(b) illustrates investment behavior for a higher
level of wealth wH > w¯.
28
27In Appendix B, we show that the threshold wGmin(a) is increasing in ability. We also show that when dmax = d0,
wGmin(a) ≥ wXmin(a) and more persons are constrained by the GSL, because it imposes an additional constraint.
28Note that w¯ ≡ wGmin(a¯) reflects the level of wealth below which agents of ability a¯ are constrained, where a¯ is
the ability level at which unconstrained investment equals the upper limit on borrowing (i.e. hU (a¯) = dmax).
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Figure 2: dU , hU , hX , and hG for low and high wealth individuals
Because of the ‘tied-to-investment’ constraint, the implied investment – ability and investment
– wealth relationships in the GSL model are more closely aligned with the empirical evidence than
the simple exogenous constraint model. First, investment is equal to the unconstrained level hU (a)
and increasing in ability for a larger range of lower ability and low/middle wealth individuals (e.g.
individuals with wealth wL and ability a ∈ (a2, a¯] in Figure 2(a)). Second, among high ability
individuals (i.e. a > a¯), investment never falls below dmax; this shrinks the range of abilities for
which investment is negatively related to ability (e.g. individuals with ability a > a4 in Figure
2(b)). Third, among high ability types, investment is weakly increasing in initial assets (e.g.
individuals with ability a ∈ (a3, a4) in Figure 2(b)).
4.5 GSL Programs and Private Lenders
Our complete model allows the coexistence of both private and public lenders. We assume that
private lenders are competitive but face limited repayment incentives from students due to the
inalienability of human capital and lack of other forms of collateral. We continue to assume full
enforcement of repayment in GSL programs.
A rational borrower repays private loans if and only if the cost of repaying is less than the cost
of defaulting. These limited incentives can be foreseen by rational lenders who, in response, limit
their supply of credit to what will be re-paid.29 Since penalties for default are likely to impose
a larger monetary cost for borrowers with higher earnings and assets — only so much can be
taken from someone with little to take — credit offered to an individual is directly related to his
perceived future earnings. Because expected earnings are determined by ability and investment,
private credit limits and investments are co-determined in equilibrium.
29Gropp, Scholz, and White (1997) empirically support this form of response by private lenders.
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In the life-cycle model of Section 5, credit limits arise from temporary exclusion from credit
markets and wage garnishments. Here, we derive a similar form of constraint by simply assuming
that defaulting borrowers lose a fraction 0 < κ˜ < 1 of labor earnings.30 In this case, optimal
repayment behavior is quite simple: borrowers repay (principal plus interest on private debt dp)
if and only if the payment Rdp is less than the punishment cost κ˜af(h). As a result, credit from
private lenders is limited to a fraction of post-school earnings:
dp ≤ κaf (h) , (7)
where κ ≡ R−1κ˜. Private credit is directly increasing in both ability and investment. Moreover,
ability may also indirectly affect credit through its influence on investment.
Students can borrow dg from the GSL (subject to (GSLC)) and dp from private lenders (subject
to (7)). Because GSL repayments are fully enforced and do not affect incentives to repay private
loans, total borrowing is constrained by
dg + dp ≤ min {h, dmax}+ κaf (h) . (8)
We use the superscript G+ L to highlight that both sources of credit are present. Note that our
GSL-only model above is a special case with no private loan enforcement (i.e. κ = 0). One could
similarly define a private lender-only economy setting dmax = 0. We use the superscript L to refer
to this special case.
The coexistence of both sources of credit reduces the incidence of constrained individuals –
relative to economies with only one of these credit sources. The threshold wG+Lmin (a) of assets below
which individuals are constrained is decreasing in dmax and κ, because increases in either of these
parameters represent an expansion of total credit. Expanding either public or private credit would
reduce the population of constrained individuals and change the investment behavior of those who
remain constrained.
Lemma 2 Let hG+L (a, w; dmax, κ) denote the optimal investment for an individual with ability a
and wealth w in an economy with dmax > 0 and κ > 0. Then: (i) w
G+L
min (a) < min
{
wGmin(a), w
L
min(a)
}
;
(ii) For constrained individuals with abilities a > a¯, the inequalities ∂h
G+L(a,w;dmax,κ)
∂dmax
> 0 and
∂hG+L(a,w;dmax,κ)
∂κ
> 0 hold.
The two sources of credit have differential impacts on investment depending on ability. Among
highly able youth constrained by the upper GSL limit and private constraints, increasing the GSL
limit may increase investment more than one-for-one, since private credit expands with investment.
The associated rise in private credit also yields an increase in consumption while in school. An
increase in private credit (i.e. a higher κ) would also raise in-school consumption and investment.
30This is consistent with wage garnishments and penalty avoidance actions like re-locating, working in the
informal economy, borrowing from loan sharks, or renting instead of buying a home, which are all costly to those
who default.
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Notice that result (ii) in this lemma applies only to higher ability persons with a > a¯ (i.e. persons
with hU(a) > dmax). Less able individuals are constrained by (TIC) and not by dmax, so an
expansion of the GSL limit has no affect on their behavior. Moreover, as we discuss below, an
increase in κ might actually reduce their investments.
Unlike the models with exogenous or government constraints alone, it is possible that for the
same level of familial resources w, a more able person is unconstrained while another with lower
ability is constrained. That is, for large enough κ, the threshold wG+Lmin (a) may be decreasing in a,
since punishment for default may be substantially more costly for the more able/higher earnings
person. For the same reason, it is possible that individuals at the top of the ability distribution
are always unconstrained (i.e. wG+Lmin (a) < 0 for high a). These features are driven entirely by the
presence of private lenders in the market.
There is an interesting interaction between GSL credit and private lending, depending on which
of the GSL constraints binds, (6) or (TIC). Among the more able individuals for whom the upper
GSL limit dmax binds, there is under-investment and investment is increasing in wealth (as in the
previous models). For individuals in this group, the ability – investment relationship depends on
the IES as well as the relative importance of the GSL and private lending. We show that if private
lending is a relatively important source of funds, investment is increasing in ability for empirically
relevant values of the IES less than one. Among lower ability individuals, for whom (6) is slack
but (TIC) binds, investment behavior can be quite different. In the absence of private lenders,
these individuals borrow and invest hU(a) as discussed earlier. With private lenders, constrained
individuals actually over-invest in human capital (i.e. h > hU(a) and af ′(h) < R) if (TIC) is
the binding GSL constraint, since on the margin, total credit is increasing more than one-for-one
with investment. This is because (i) additional marginal investments can be financed fully by the
GSL, and (ii) additional investments raise earnings, which expands access to private credit and
allows for greater consumption while in school. Over-investing is socially inefficient and produces
a negative relationship between investment and wealth for those individuals. Furthermore, their
investment may decline with more access to private credit (i.e. an increase in κ). In any event, in
this situation, we show that a positive relationship between ability and investment arises under
fairly weak conditions (e.g. a constant IES).
The following proposition summarizes the relationship between investment, ability, and wealth
when GSL programs and private lending co-exist. To this end, define %(a) ≡ Rdmax
af(dmax)
(≡ 0 if
dmax = 0), the fraction of post-school earnings someone of ability a can borrow from the GSL if
they invest h = dmax.
31
Proposition 3 Assume dmax > 0 and κ > 0 and consider constrained individuals with w <
wG+Lmin (a), so constraint (8) binds. Then, the following results hold: (1) If a > a¯, then: (i)
hG+L (a, w) < hU(a), (ii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly increasing in w, (iii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly in-
31When a > a¯, %(a) is less than the elasticity of earnings with respect to human capital investment evaluated at
h = dmax, i.e. %(a) = a¯a
f ′(dmax)dmax
f(dmax)
< f
′(dmax)dmax
f(dmax)
.
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creasing in a if either (a) the IES is bounded below by 1−κR
1−%(a) or (b) βR ≤ 1, the IES is non-
decreasing in consumption and bounded below by 1
1−%(a)
(
1−κ(R+1)
1+κ(β−1−R)
)
. (2) If a < a¯, then: (i)
hG+L (a, w) > hU(a), (ii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly decreasing in w, and (iii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly
increasing in a if the IES is constant.
The size of the GSL program has complicated effects on the ability – investment relationship
when private lending is also available. On one hand, a larger GSL limit dmax reduces the mass of
individuals for which this constraint is binding (i.e. it increases a¯). Assuming the weak condition of
part (2)(iii) is met, this ensures a positive ability – investment relationship for a broader range of
ability levels. On the other hand, a larger value of dmax increases the value of % (a), thus reducing
the range of IES that ensures a positive ability – investment relationship for those higher ability
individuals constrained by dmax.
32
Increasing private lending (i.e. κ) weakens the conditions in part (1) for a positive ability –
investment relationship, allowing for a broader range of IES values. Upon inspection of condition
(a) in part (1)(iii), if someone investing h = dmax can borrow more from private lenders than from
the GSL program (i.e. dmax < κaf(dmax)), then there is a positive ability – investment relationship
for a range of IES less than one. In general, the bound in (b) is weaker, so under additional mild
conditions, a positive ability – investment relationship holds for still lower values of the IES.
5 Quantitative Analysis
We now explore the quantitative implications of our model of public and private lending for
schooling. To this end, we extend our two-period model to a multi-period setting which we
calibrate using data on college costs, labor earnings, and other features of the U.S. economy. We
examine whether the model can reproduce the main empirical patterns reported in Sections 2 and
3. We also consider the effects of potential policy changes.
5.1 A Multiperiod Model
Consider individuals whose post-secondary life is the time interval [S, T ] which is divided into
three stages: “Youth”, t ∈ [S, P ), when individuals invest in school; “maturity,” t ∈ [P,R), when
they work full-time; and “retirement,” t ∈ [R, T ], when they consume from accumulated savings.
S reflects the starting age of college education, P the entry to full-time participation in labor
markets, R the start of retirement, and T the age of death.
Preferences are standard. As of any t0 ∈ [S, T ], a consumption flow c (t) generates utility
U (t0) =
∫ T
t0
e−ρ(t−t0)
[
c (t)1−σ
1− σ
]
dt, (9)
32If only private lending prevails (i.e. dmax = 0), then % (a) = 0 and only part (1) of Proposition 3 is relevant
since a¯ = 0. In this case, both conditions for a positive ability – investment relationship admit a (potentially large)
range of IES below one.
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where σ > 0 is the inverse of the IES and ρ > 0 is a subjective discount rate.
We assume competitive financial markets. The market interest rate is r > 0, which may differ
from ρ. Consumption and investment are restricted by the lifetime budget constraint∫ T
S
e−r(t−S)c (t) dt+
∫ P
S
e−r(t−S)x (t) dt ≤ w +
∫ R
P
e−r(t−S)y (t) dt, (10)
where w ≥ 0 indicates the individual’s own financial wealth as of t = S.33
Individuals are endowed with a minimum human capital h0 ≥ 0 but they can invest to increase
the human capital with which they enter the labor market at t = P .34 An investment flow
x (t) ≥ 0 during the schooling period accumulates into a stock of human capital investment
hI ≡
∫ P
S
e−r(t−S)x (t) dt at date P . We assume that the government matches every unit of privately
financed investment with a subsidy rate of s ≥ 0. Total human capital at the time of labor market
entry is, therefore,
h = h0 + (1 + s)hI . (11)
We abstract from the timing of the flow x(t) and focus on accumulated private investment (hI)
and total human capital (h).35 As a normalization, the units of h, hI , and h0 are all in present
value terms as of date t = S, the beginning of the schooling period.
Labor earnings at date t, y (t), depend positively on individual ability a, schooling h, and
experience E (t− P ) accumulated since labor market entry at date t = P :
y (t) = ahαE (t− P ) , (12)
where 0 < α < 1 and E (t− P ) = exp
(∫ t
P
g(z)dz
)
where g(z) is the rate of growth of earnings at
date z. For any two dates t0 < t1, define Φ[t0,t1] ≡
∫ t1
t0
e−r(t−t0)E (t− P ) dt as the discounted value
of earnings over the period t0 to t1 that comes from the accumulation of experience (discounted
to date t0). With this definition, the present value of lifetime labor income (as of date t = S) is
e−r(P−S)Φ[P,R]ahα.36
5.2 Unrestricted Allocations
Frictionless financial markets allow individuals to fully smooth consumption and maximize the
present value of lifetime labor earnings net of investments costs, −hI+e−r(P−S)Φ[P,R]a [h0 + (1 + s)hI ]α.
33Since, for simplicity, we assume that human capital is produced from goods rather than time inputs, w is
most easily thought of as the present value of family transfers during youth. We could equivalently assume that
human capital investment only requires time inputs and that an individual’s total ‘initial wealth’, w, reflects family
transfers plus the total discounted value of earnings he could receive if he worked (rather than attended school) full-
time during “youth”. In this case, private investment costs reflect any earnings foregone for school. Our calibration
below implicitly assumes both goods and time investments are perfectly substitutable and combines these costs to
determine total investment in human capital.
34We have also estimated a version of the model allowing h0 to depend on ability a. These more general estimates
suggest that h0 is about 25% higher for the top AFQT quartile relative to the bottom quartile; other parameter
estimates were very similar to our baseline values. Most importantly, simulation results for the more general model
were quite similar to those presented here.
35Implicitly, our analysis assumes that investments during youth are perfectly substitutable over time.
36Our results readily extend to the case where h0 and/or E (t− P ) are increasing in a.
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Individuals with ability a ≤ a0 ≡ h
1−α
0
α(1+s)e−r(P−S)Φ[P,R]
do not find it worth investing above what is
publicly provided and choose hI = 0. Those with a > a0 equate the marginal return on human
capital investment with its private marginal cost of investing. The resulting unconstrained level
of total human capital investment is
hU (a) = max
{
h0,
[
α (1 + s) ae−r(P−S)Φ[P,R]
] 1
1−α
}
, (13)
and private investment is hUI (a) =
[
hU (a)− h0
]
/ (1 + s). Both hU (a) and hUI (a) are independent
of the individual’s wealth.
The optimal consumption path grows at the constant rate r−ρ
σ
over the life-cycle. Define
the function Θ[t0,t1] ≡
∫ t1
t0
e[
r−ρ
σ
−r](t−t0)dt as the cumulation of present value factors along the
unconstrained optimal path for consumption between any pair of dates t0 and t1. Under the
unrestricted allocations, an individual with ability a and initial wealth w enters the labor market
with a debt (in present value terms of t = P )
dU (a, w) = Φ[P,R]
(
Θ[S,P ]
Θ[S,T ]
)
a
[
hU (a)
]α
+ er(P−S)
(
1− Θ[S,P ]
Θ[S,T ]
)(
hUI (a)− w
)
. (14)
This function dU (a, w) shares the same essential properties as in the two-period model.
5.3 Borrowing Constraints
To introduce limitations in the amount of credit for post-secondary education, it is convenient to
first describe utility at the time of labor market entry (t = P ) for an individual with ability a,
human capital h and financial liabilities d. If he fully repays all debts, the present value (as of
t = P ) of his net lifetime resources is Φ[P,R]ah
α − d. Optimal consumption smoothing implies a
discounted utility
V RP (a, h, d) = Θ[P,T ]
[(
Φ[P,R]ah
α − d) /Θ[P,T ]]1−σ
1− σ , (15)
where Θ[t0,t1] is defined above. The superscript R indicates full repayment and the subscript P
indicates that it is discounted utility as of date t = P .
5.3.1 GSL Programs and Private Lending
Young individuals can borrow from GSL programs, dg, and from private lenders, dp. Credit from
the GSL is tied to schooling-related expenses, subject to a maximum cumulative amount:
dg ≤ min {hI , dmax} , (16)
for some 0 < dmax < ∞. Here, government credit is linked to personal out-of-pocket investment
expenses hI rather than total human capital h. We assume that GSL loans entail a fixed repayment
schedule r (t; dg) over the employment period. The repayment
∫ R
P
e−r(t−P )r (t; dg) dt = dg is fully
enforced regardless of whether individuals default on private loans.
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In addition to dg, private loans dp would lead to total borrowing d = dg + dp during school.
Private lenders restrict student credit due to their limited ability to punish default. We assume
that they employ two punishments commonly assumed in the literature on consumer bankruptcy
(e.g. Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Chatterjee, et al (2007)). First, defaulting borrowers
are reported to credit bureaus, an action that disrupts, at least temporarily, their access to formal
credit markets. This penalty inhibits consumption smoothing, which can be quite costly when
the IES is low and the earnings profile is steep in experience. Second, defaulting borrowers must
forfeit a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1) of their labor earnings. The fraction γ encompasses direct garnishments
from lenders and/or the costs of actions taken by borrowers to avoid direct penalties (e.g. working
in the informal sector, renting instead of owning a house, etc.). Both penalties last for a period
of length 0 ≤ pi < R − P that starts the moment default takes place. (The special case of pi = 0
implies that punishments are negligible and private credit is non-existent.)
We make three additional assumptions that greatly simplify the analysis: (i) individuals can
only default on private loans at the time of labor market entry; (ii) individuals that choose to
repay their private student loans have access to perfect financial markets upon entry into the
labor market; and (iii) individuals that default on private loans can access frictionless and fully
enforceable credit markets after the punishment period. In short, we abstract from issues related
to the optimal timing of default and the enforcement of post-school loans.37 Assumptions (i) and
(ii) help to isolate and focus on the impact of limited access to credit during school. For many
parameter values, (iii) is not an assumption but an equilibrium outcome.38
Consider an individual that decides to default on private debt dp at the time of labor market
entry. With ability a, human capital h, and GSL liabilities dg, his attainable utility is:
V DP (a, h, dg, r(·; dg)) =
P+pi∫
P
e−ρ(t−P )
[
(1− γ) ahαE (t− P )−r (t; dg)]1−σ
1− σ dt+ e
−ρpiV RP+pi
(
a, h, dP+pig
)
The first term is the discounted utility during the punishment phase from P to P + pi. During
that time, consumption equals earnings net of garnishments (from private lenders) and net debt
repayments (to GSL lenders.) The second term reflects the discounted utility acquired after the
punishment phase. When entering this phase, the individual carries a liability with GSL lenders
equal to dP+pig = e
rpi
[
dg −
∫ P+pi
P
e−r(t−P )r(t, dg)dt
]
but is cleared of all private debt. At the end of
the punishment period, he is granted unrestricted access to financial markets and can optimally
smooth consumption thereafter. His utility V RP+pi
(
a, h, dP+pig
)
as of that time is determined by
equation (15) but for time t = P + pi. Note that the value of default V DP (a, h, dg, r(·; dg)) depends
on the actual timing of GSL repayment r (·; dg) but not on the amount of private debt dp.39
37See Monge-Naranjo (2009) for a continuous time model in which default can take place in any period and the
optimal contract must satisfy a continuum of participation constraints.
38For example, see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002).
39The value of repayment does not depend on the timing of GSL repayment, since individuals that do not default
can freely borrow and lend after school to fully smooth consumption. On the other hand, private debt is irrelevant
in the case of default, since borrowers are cleared of all debts.
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A borrower would repay a private debt dp if and only if V
R
P (a, h, dg + dp) ≥ V DP (a, h, dg, r(·; dg)),
a condition that implicitly defines the maximum private credit limit as a function of a, h, and dg.
The many different paths that GSL repayments r (·, dg) can take affect this private credit limit.
As shown in Appendix C, the faster an individual must repay GSL loans, the more costly it is
to default and the more he can borrow in private loans. That shorter GSL repayment schedules
allow private lenders to extend more credit is interesting given recent moves in the U.S. to extend
GSL repayment periods through loan consolidation and other options. We consider the effects of
different repayment periods further below.
For analytical tractability, we assume that GSL debtors must repay at least a constant fraction δ
of their earnings during the punishment period to service their GSL debt. Therefore, consumption
during the punishment period equals ahαE (t− P ) (1− γ − δ) and the value of GSL debt balance
at the end of the punishment period equals erpi
(
dg − δΦ[P,P+pi]ahα
)
. The structure of repayments
after P + pi is irrelevant, since individuals can then freely borrow and save. Moreover, if we
assume that the GSL repayment rate is set such that individuals repay a constant fraction of
their income (net of garnishments in the case of default) over their entire working lives, i.e.
δ∗ = (1−γ)dg
[Φ[P,R]−γΦ[P,P+pi]]ahα
, then we obtain a simple closed-form private lending constraint:40
dp ≤ κ1Φ[P,R]ahα + κ2dg, (17)
where 0 ≤ κ1 ≤ 1 and κ2 ≥ −1 are both constants that depend on preferences (σ, ρ), the interest
rate r, and enforcement parameters (γ, pi). (See Appendix C for details.) It is important to note
that κ1 and κ2 incorporate the effects of punishment for default and that they do not depend
on government subsidies s or the minimum human capital level h0. Both s and h0 only affect
private constraints through total human capital h and GSL borrowing dg. In general, we find
that κ2 > −1 and therefore private credit does not decrease one-for-one with expansions of GSL
credit. However, κ2 < 0 implies a partial ‘crowding out’ of private credit with expansions in GSL
programs.
In contrast to the two-period model, even if wage garnishments are not allowed (γ = 0), private
lending can be sustained (κ1 > 0) as long as defaulting individuals face a disruption in their ability
to smooth consumption by being excluded from credit markets for some period (i.e. pi > 0). It is
only when pi = 0 that the punishment for default is negligible and private credit dries up entirely
(i.e. κ1 = κ2 = 0). In general, the amount of sustainable borrowing (as determined by κ1 and κ2)
is higher with: (i) tougher punishments (higher values of γ and pi); (ii) more patient individuals
(lower discount rate ρ) because future punishments are more costly; (iii) a stronger desire to
smooth consumption (lower IES, higher σ), and (iv) higher growth in earnings with experience.
40In practice, American students can generally extend their GSL repayment period up to 30 years through loan
consolidation and other repayment plans.
21
5.3.2 The Behavior of Human Capital Investment
We adopt the private lending constraints defined by equation (17) as our baseline case. Therefore,
optimal schooling investment decisions maximize initial discounted utility given by (9) subject to
h = h0 + (1 + s)hI , the budget constraint
∫ P
S
e−r(t−S)c (t) dt + hI ≤ w + e−r(P−S) (dp + dg), and
the credit constraints (16) and (17).
Investment behavior is analogous to that of the two-period model. Given our human capital
production function, we can define %(a) ≡ dmax
Φ[P,R]a[h0+(1+s)dmax]
α . For a > a¯, we have %(a) <
αe−r(P−S)
[
1 + h0
(1+s)dmax
]−1
< α < 1, which is useful in characterizing the ability – investment
relationship. See Appendix C for further details and the proof for the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider individuals with ability a > a0 (i.e. h
U
I (a) > 0) and whose wealth w is
below the threshold wG+Lmin (a), so constraints (16) and (17) bind. Then, the following holds: (1) If
a > a¯, then: (i) hG+L (a, w) < hU(a), (ii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly increasing in w, (iii) hG+L (a, w)
is strictly increasing in a if either (a) κ1 ≥ Θ[S,P ]Θ[S,T ] or (b) σ ≤
[
1−
(
1+κ2
1−κ1
)
% (a)
] [
1− κ1 Θ[S,T ]Θ[S,P ]
]−1
hold. (2) If a < a¯, then: (i) hG+L (a, w) > hU(a), (ii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly decreasing in w, and
(iii) hG+L (a, w) is strictly increasing in a.
As with the two-period model, the strength of the link between lifetime earnings and private
credit (κ1) is important in generating a positive ability – investment relationship. Even for high
values of σ (i.e. low values of the IES) the sufficient conditions of the proposition hold if κ1 is high
enough, e.g. higher than
Θ[S,P ]
Θ[S,T ]
, the ratio of present value consumption while in school relative to
lifetime consumption. This is just a sufficient condition, and it is likely to hold if the schooling
period is short relative to the lifespan or if the agent is patient. As in the two-period model, the
effect of dmax is complex: on one hand, a higher dmax increases a¯ and more individuals can directly
finance hU (a) with GSL programs alone; on the other hand, a higher dmax increases % (a) and
makes it more difficult for the sufficient condition in part (1)(iii)(b) to hold.
Aside from the important advantage of facilitating calibration, the multiperiod model embodies
economic forces that are absent from the two period model. Most interestingly, κ1 is increasing
in σ because the cost of disrupting consumption smoothing is increasing in the curvature of the
utility function. Indeed, the sufficient conditions for part (1)(b) can hold more easily when σ is
high (IES low). This is the case under our calibration.
5.4 Parameter Values
We now discuss the parameter values used to study the quantitative implications of our model.
We normalize time so that a unit interval represents a calendar year. All monetary amounts are
denominated in 1999 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). As a measure of ability,
we use quartiles of the AFQT distribution in our sample. This facilitates comparison with the
empirical patterns discussed earlier in Section 3. Baseline parameter values, reported in Table 3,
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Table 3: Baseline Model Parameters
Calibrated Parameters GMM estimates
Parameter Value To match: Parameter Value Coefficient on:
S 19 g0 0.03 Experience
P 26 US Demographics
R 65 α 0.70 Schooling investment
T 80 h0 160,312 Min. human capital
pi 10 U.S. Legal environment
ρ = r 0.05 See text AFQT Quartiles:
σ 2 IES = 0.5 a1 1.51 1
dmax 35,000 GSL Loan Limits a2 1.55 2
γ 0.2 Garnishments & other costs a3 1.60 3
s 0.80 Subsidy school grades 10+ a4 1.72 4
are chosen to match basic features of the U.S. economy, while others are estimated using data on
earnings and educational attainment from the random sample of males in the NLSY79.
With our focus on college education, we assume that youth (investment period) begins at age
S = 19; maturity (labor market participation) begins at age P = 26; and retirement runs from
age R = 65 until death at age T = 80. These values roughly capture the demographics and the
timing of college education and labor market decisions in the U.S.
We assume an annual interest rate r = 0.05 based on historical averages of the risk-less rate
and the return to capital in the U.S. We also set ρ = r. Given our calibration strategy, reasonable
variations of ρ and r, including differences between them, have little impact on our results. We set
σ = 2, which implies an IES of 0.5 – an intermediate value in the estimates reported in Browning,
Hansen, and Heckman (1999). Values of σ inside the interval [1.5, 3] yield similar results.
We calibrate the length of the penalty period pi based on the U.S. legal environment. According
to U.S. bankruptcy code, individuals must wait for at least 7 years after filing for Chapter 7 before
they qualify to file again, while default records remain in an individual’s credit history for a
period of 10 years. Thus, pi should range between 7 and 10. In our baseline, we set pi = 10, but
pi = 7 produces similar conclusions. Regarding the effective earnings ‘lost’ in the event of private
loan default, regulations provide little direct guidance. For private unsecured loans, an explicit
garnishment rule does not exist. Moreover, actual costs of default – either via direct penalties
or via avoidance actions – extend beyond simple garnishments (e.g. individuals may end up sub-
optimally employed, renting instead of owing a house, and paying sub-prime interest rates for
short-term transactions, etc.) Finally, defaulting may involve other non-pecuniary costs as well
as disruption in career possibilities. We set γ = 0.2 as the baseline fraction of lost earnings for
individuals who default. This fraction is a bit higher than in Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007)
and Chatterjee, et al. (2007), partly because we abstract from the benefits of financial markets in
smoothing out temporary earnings and preference shocks. Finally, we assume dmax = 35, 000 based
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on loan limits for Perkins and Stafford Loan Programs.41 Below, we explore reasonable changes
in this upper GSL loan limit as well as private loan enforcement parameters γ and pi. Finally, we
also report how the predictions of this model differ from an exogenous constraint model with a
limit equal to d0 = 70, 000, a value we explain below.
5.4.1 Estimation of the earnings function
Data on wage income, education, age, and AFQT quartile from the NLSY79 (1979-2006) are used
to estimate parameters of the labor earnings function. Our sample includes all men ages 19+
with at least 12 years of completed schooling from the random sample. We associate different
levels of investment with different levels of reported schooling, calculating the total expenditures
associated with each level of schooling separately by AFQT quartile. These costs include both
foregone earnings and direct expenditures as discussed below. Consistent with the formulation of
the model, we make no distinction for investment in time costs (foregone earnings) or purchased
inputs. Implicitly, they are perfect substitutes in the production of human capital, an issue we
discuss further in the online appendix. We also abstract from investment differences related to
differences in college quality. While an interesting margin of choice, we leave this to future work.
Estimation of the labor earnings function proceeds in three separate steps:
Step 1: Estimating foregone earnings. Foregone earnings reflect the present value of
average earnings relative to someone with 12 years of completed schooling, taking into account
earnings during college. For someone with C years of college, we first calculate average earnings
at ages 19 through 19 + C by AFQT quartile for all non-enrolled men with exactly 12 years of
completed schooling (based on highest grade reported in the NLSY79). We then subtract predicted
earnings at ages 19 through 19 +C for men currently enrolled in college to obtain our measure of
foregone earnings.42
Step 2: Determining total costs of schooling and the government subsidy matching
rate. Total schooling expenditures are set to zero for those with only 12 years of completed
schooling. For those attending college, we add foregone earnings determined in Step 1 to direct
costs to determine total schooling expenditures. Direct expenditures are based on current-fund
expenditures per full-time equivalent student in all institutions of higher education (1999 Digest of
Education Statistics, Table 342). Direct expenditures for the first two years of college are based on
41As discussed in Section 2, there are a number of different government loan limits depending on the type of
loan, dependency status, and whether the student is an undergraduate or graduate student. Our choice of $35,000
is higher than the limit for dependent undergraduates borrowing only from the Stafford program but lower than
the limit for independent undergraduates or for graduate students.
42Let y¯12(q, j) reflect average wage income for men with 12 years of schooling, AFQT quartile q, and age j. Let
yˆC(q, j) reflect predicted earnings for men with C years of completed college (i.e. highest grade completed less 12),
AFQT quartile q, and age j. This prediction is based on a regression of earnings on AFQT quartile indicators,
experience (= age −19), and experience-squared using a sample of men that are enrolled in college and whose age
is between 19 and 26 (with age not exceeding 18 + C). Then, foregone earnings for someone with AFQT quartile
q and C ≥ 1 years of college completed are calculated as FE(q, C) =
C−1∑
x=0
(1 + r)1−x[y¯12(q, 19 + x)− yˆC(q, 19 + x)]
for interest rate r = .05.
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2-yr school averages for academic years 1980-81 to 1984-85, while direct expenditures for 3+ years
of college are based on 4-yr school averages for academic years 1980-81 to 1989-90.43 These dates
correspond to the years most students in our NLSY79 sample attended college. See Table D1 in
Appendix D for measures of direct expenditures, foregone earnings, and total expenditures.
To calculate the subsidy rate s used in our analysis, we first compute marginal subsidy rates
for each year of college (1-8 years) by AFQT quartile.44 Since these rates differ somewhat by
the number of years of schooling and AFQT quartile, we average over these values using the
distribution of completed schooling in our NLSY79 sample. The resulting government subsidy
matching rate is s = 0.799. In simulating the ‘year 2000’ economy below, we use a lower subsidy
matching rate of s = 0.710, consistent with the observed rise in current fund revenue that came
from tuition.45
Step 3: Estimating the parameters. With Step 2, we have imputed total investment
expenditures h(q, C) for each AFQT quartile q and years of completed schooling C.46 We next
estimate α, h0, g, and ability parameters a1, ..., a4 using NLSY79 data on wage income, schooling,
and age.
In the model, earnings at any experience x = age− 26 for someone who invested hI are:
y(a, x) = aE(x; g)[h0 + hI (1 + s)]
α,
where E(x; g) is a known function of experience and parameters g. We use E(x; g) = exp(gx), so
earnings are log linear in experience. Taking logs and assuming earnings are measured with error
εi, we have the following specification for individual earnings as a function of AFQT quartile qi
and schooling Ci:
ln(yi) = ln[aqi ] + gx+ α ln[h0 + h(qi, Ci)] + εi. (18)
The model’s implied unconstrained investment for someone with ability a is given by expression
(13) with Φ[P,R] =
e(g−r)(R−P )−1
g−r given our assumption that earnings are log linear in experience.
We use GMM to estimate our parameters using moments based on both (18) and (13):
E {[ln(yi)− (ln[aqi ] + gx+ α ln[h0 + h(qi, Ci)])]Zi} = 0
E
{
h0 + h(qi, Ci)− hU(aqi)|qi
}
= 0,
43Direct expenditures for 3+ year of college are based on 3+ years of average expenditures at 4-year schools,
while direct expenditures for 1-2 years are based on 1-2 years at two-year schools. Because average expenditures
at 4-year institutions are higher than at 2-year institutions, this generates a noticeable jump in direct expenditures
between 2 and 3 years of college.
44The marginal subsidy is computed as 0.77 × direct expenditures divided by total expenditures, where 0.77
reflects the ratio of current-fund revenue that does not come from tuition and fees averaged over academic years
1980-81 to 1989-90 (Digest of Education Statistics, 2003, Table 333).
45In 1995-96, the ratio of current-fund revenue that did not come from tuition and fees was 0.72, down from 0.77
in the 1980s (Digest of Education Statistics, 2003, Table 333).
46Since we include total expenditures in calculating h(q, C), it reflects total private investment plus public
subsidies (i.e. hI(a)(1 + s)).
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where Zi includes indicators for each year of schooling from grades 12 to 20, experience x, and
AFQT quartile indicators.47 The first set of moments using the wage equation simply estimates
parameters to best fit average earnings conditional on schooling, age, and AFQT quartile. Using
only this set of moments is nearly identical to non-linear least squares estimation of equation (18).
With the second set of moments, we also match average schooling expenditures by AFQT quartile
with the unconstrained optimal levels as implied by the model.48
The strategy of estimating of (aq, α, g, h0) targeting unconstrained investments is consistent
with evidence in the NLSY79 (e.g. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999) and Carneiro and Heckman
(2002)) suggesting that most individuals were not constrained in their schooling investments at
that time. However, it is important to note that this does not guarantee that simulations of our
baseline model necessarily lead to these unrestricted investments. None of our assumptions about
the credit environment (i.e. the GSL program and private lending under limited commitment)
imply adequate credit for everyone. Therefore, one metric for evaluating our model is whether
anyone is constrained in our baseline calibration. For this to be the case, the thresholds wG+Lmin (a)
implied by the model should be low.
Finally, it is important to discuss the nature and correct interpretation of an individual’s
available resources w in our simulations. Because foregone earnings are an important part of
investment expenditures in our calibration, w includes at least the amount he could earn if he
began working immediately after high school. These amounts depend on ability, since foregone
earnings depend on ability (see Appendix Table D1). The relevant range of available resources,
therefore, begins at $36, 000 for the least able, $73, 000 for AFQT quartile 2, $76, 000 for AFQT
quartile 3, and $79, 000 for the top quartile. Any available resources above these amounts must
be interpreted as transfers from parents or others.
5.5 Baseline Simulations
We now report the model’s main implications given our baseline parameterization. Figure 3 shows
the wealth threshold wG+L (a) for our benchmark model. It also shows wG (a) and wL (a), the
special cases when we shut down private or GSL credit, respectively. Individuals with ability-
wealth pairs above and to the left of the thresholds are unconstrained, while those with pairs
below and to the right are constrained. The x-marks indicate the point estimates for each ability
quartile as reported in Table 3. Finally, the dotted horizontal lines reflect estimated potential
earnings (PE) for these same ability levels.
47We do not attempt to address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity in estimating the wage equation (i.e.
we assume εi is orthogonal to completed schooling conditional on AFQT).
48We could have estimated the parameters of the human capital production function using only the moments
based on the wage equation. However, this produces fairly noisy estimates of most parameters, especially h0. Since
the model implies an optimal unconstrained investment that is quite sensitive to all parameter values, including
the second set of moments provides much more precise and robust estimates. We do not lose much in terms of
mean squared error (MSE) for the log wage equation when estimating the model using both sets of moments. This
MSE only increases from 0.593 to 0.601 when the second set of moments are used.
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Figure 3: Thresholds for Unconstrained Allocations (Baseline)
The baseline model implies that individuals in the NLSY79 were unconstrained, justifying
our estimation strategy of matching unconstrained investment with average investment in the
data. For all estimated ability types aq, the dotted PE(aq) lines lie above the corresponding
wealth threshold wG+L(aq). This implies that even youth who receive zero transfers (from their
parents or other sources) can attain unconstrained consumption and investment allocations given
available credit from the GSL and private lending. Regardless of individual resources, our baseline
parametrization implies investments of $8,000, $22,300, $44,600, and $100,900 for AFQT quartiles
1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.49 Clearly, our model implies considerable differences in educational
investment between the most and least able as observed in the NLSY79.
Figure 3 also reveals that ability quartiles 2 and 3 would be unconstrained by the GSL alone;
thus, middle ability individuals would not need to borrow from private lenders. Lower ability
individuals lie in the flat region of wG and wG+L, indicating that the GSL’s tied-to-investment
constraint (i.e. dg ≤ hI) may bind. The fact that wG(a1) < PE(a1) < wG+L(a1) implies that the
least able would be constrained (low consumption during school) under the GSL alone, but they
receive enough credit from private lenders to enable full consumption smoothing. Among the most
able, the upper GSL loan limit (i.e. dg ≤ dmax) binds for those receiving no family transfers. They
would under-invest without access to private lenders; however, private lenders provide enough
credit to ensure unconstrained maximization.
Figure 4 reports total borrowing dg + dp for each level of ability as a function of initial wealth
minus potential earnings (i.e. family or outside transfers). Only youth from the top AFQT quartile
49These reflect total expenditures for post-secondary education and are very close to average total expenditures
by AFQT quartile in the NLSY79 (from least to most able): $8,800, $29,000, $47,400, $107,700. See Table D1 in
the appendix for a mapping between these amounts and years of college attendance.
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Figure 4: Total Borrowing as a Function of Ability and Wealth less Potential Earnings (Baseline)
with very low resources wish to borrow more than the upper GSL limit (reflected in the dashed
horizontal line at $35,000).50 Among the most able, roughly $35,000 in family transfers (received
over ages 19-26) would be enough to ensure unconstrained consumption and investment without
any need for private loans. All other youth wish to borrow less than the GSL maximum. As noted
above, youth from the lowest ability quartile would like to borrow more than they invest, which
the GSL does not accommodate. As a result, the least able receiving less than $20,000 in family
transfers (cumulative over ages 19-26) would like to borrow small amounts from private lenders
(e.g. credit cards) in order to smooth consumption. Youth in the interquartile range invest more
than they wish to borrow from the GSL and do not run up against the GSL upper loan limit; they
are fully unconstrained by the GSL regardless of parental transfers.
Altogether, our baseline model fits the ‘1980s facts’ quite well. The prediction that investment
is unconstrained for all ability levels is consistent with the evidence from the NLSY79, i.e. that
investments are independent of the individual’s wealth and strongly increasing in ability. The
model further predicts that most NLSY79 respondents should borrow less than the GSL maximum.
Only youth with high ability and low family transfers would borrow up to the GSL maximum and
then some from private lenders. This is consistent with the fact that early private student loan
programs in the 1980s were relatively unimportant and almost exclusively served students of elite
institutions and professional schools.
50This group should be quite small given the strong correlation between ability and family resources observed
in the NLSY79. For example, Table 2 in Belley and Lochner (2007) reveals that 70% of youth from the highest
AFQT quartile have family income in the top half of the distribution.
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6 Counterfactual Exercises
We now use our model to conduct two sets of counterfactual exercises. First, we simulate an
increase in both the costs of and the returns to education as observed between the 1980s and early
2000s to see whether our model is consistent with the rising importance of family resources as a
determinant of schooling and the increase in student borrowing from both the GSL and private
lenders. Second, we conduct a number of policy experiments related to the financing of college
education.
6.1 A Rise in the Costs of and Returns to Schooling
We simulate the effects of an increase in the costs of and returns to schooling — two major eco-
nomic changes that took place between the early 1980s and early 2000s. We model an increase
in the wage returns to education by assuming that α increases by 0.01 to 0.71, which leads to
a modest increase in the college – high school log wage differential.51 We model the rise in net
tuition costs by assuming that the government subsidy rate, s, falls from 0.799 to 0.71. As dis-
cussed above, this reduction reflects the increased importance of tuition and fees as a fraction of
total current-fund revenue for public and private universities in the U.S. Our simulations capture
the observed stability of maximum GSL loans in real terms by assuming that dmax remains un-
changed at $35, 000. We refer to the baseline parameterization as the “1980s economy” and to the
counterfactual parameterization as the “2000s economy.”
The model suggests that the higher returns to investment led to an increase in the amount of
available private credit. However, the demand for credit rose even more such that the wG+L(a)
thresholds increased substantially relative to their 1980 levels as shown in Figure 5. A much larger
set of wealth-ability pairs lies in the constrained region in the 2000s. The model suggests that
many youth receiving little or moderate transfers from their parents are likely to be borrowing
constrained in the more recent period. Finally, the kink in the threshold that was present in the
1980s economy disappears completely in the 2000s economy. Only the steep region of the threshold
remains, indicating that the only potentially binding constraint in the GSL is dg ≤ dmax. This
rules out the possibility of over-investment.
In the 2000s economy, wealth becomes an important determinant of human capital investment.
Figure 6 shows total investment, hI(1 + s), as a function of available resources, w. The solid lines
represent investment for the estimated ability levels by AFQT quartile; dotted vertical lines indi-
cate potential earnings and delineate the empirically relevant regions of w for each ability quartile.
51There is some disagreement in the literature regarding the underlying cause for the increase in estimated college
– high school wage differentials. Some argue that much of the rise is due to a rising ‘return to ability’, while others
argue that most of the rise is due to an increase in the actual ‘return to school’. See Cawley, et al. (2000) and
Taber (2001) for detailed discussions of the empirical difficulties and evidence. Changing α more closely reflects
the latter, but we increase α less than the amount needed to fully account for the rise in the college – high school
log wage differential. An increase in the ‘return to ability’ is equivalent to shifting the ability distribution upwards
in our framework, which produces qualitatively similar effects to those discussed here.
29
1.5 1.55 1.6 1.65 1.7
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
x 104
ability
av
ai
la
bl
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s (
w)
Thresholds for Unscontrained Allocations
 
 
w
G+L(a) in 2000s
Unconstrained Region
w
G+L(a) in 1980s
PE(a3)
PE(a4)
PE(a1)
w
X(a) in 2000s
PE(a2)
Figure 5: Thresholds for Unconstrained Allocations
Consistent with the predictions of Proposition 4, constrained investment is steeply increasing in
wealth until it reaches the unconstrained level. Constraints are binding for a wide range of wealth
levels. Most notably, the top ability individuals can only reach unconstrained investments and
consumption if their parents give them at least $70,000 during college.
Credit available from the GSL is no longer sufficient in the 2000s economy. As shown in
Figure 7, the model predicts a significant expansion in the set of individuals borrowing beyond the
maximum dmax from the GSL. Private lending expands to the point that it is comparable to or
greater than GSL borrowing for youth with low-to-medium parental transfers. Among the most
able, borrowing from private lenders is as much as $50,000 for a large range of wealth (and parental
transfer) levels. Private lenders are willing to provide the extra credit in the 2000s, because the
increased return to investment raises earnings and the cost of default. Interestingly, borrowing is
not monotone in wealth, because constrained wealthy individuals consume and invest more. The
latter expands private credit.
The endogeneity of credit limits is important. To see this, compare our baseline model with
an exogenous constraint model. Figure 5 includes the threshold wX (a) assuming d0 = 70, 000
the exogenous limit that yields the same wealth threshold for the lowest ability quartile in the
‘2000s economy’.52 The same set of low ability individuals are constrained in either model, but the
steeper wX(a) curve implies that more higher ability individuals are constrained under exogenous
constraints. The gap between the two thresholds is increasing in ability, since private credit
endogenously increases with ability.
The endogeneity of borrowing limits implies an ‘extensive margin’ effect on the ability – in-
52That is, wG+L(a1) = wX(a1). This exogenous constraint level is also consistent with the 1980s, since it does
not bind for any estimated ability levels.
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Figure 8: Total investment in human capital for w = 80, 000 and w = 100, 000 (2000s)
vestment relationship, since more able persons attain unrestricted investments. There is also an
‘intensive margin’ effect among those that are constrained. Figure 8 compares the relationship
between ability and human capital investment (for two wealth levels) implied by exogenous con-
straints and our baseline model with endogenous GSL and private credit constraints. The effects
of endogenous constraints on the extensive margin are evident in the wider range of abilities for
which unconstrained investment is observed. The effects on the intensive margin for those that
are constrained is reflected in the different slopes between the solid and dashed lines at higher
abilities. As expected from Proposition 1 and σ > 1, the exogenous constraint model predicts that
constrained investment is decreasing in ability. With exogenous constraints, low-income youth
from the top AFQT quartile would invest 5% less than youth from the third quartile. In contrast,
our baseline model predicts that constrained investments are essentially flat in ability.53
It is noteworthy, however, that our model delivers the observed positive ability – investment
relationship at the bottom of the family income distribution where family transfers are likely to be
negligible. Comparing youth receiving no family or other transfers (i.e. w = PE(a)), the most able
invest more than double the least able. This is because potential earnings (i.e. resources available
to those receiving zero transfers) are increasing in ability. More generally, total investment is
increasing in ability for any given level of transfers, w − PE(a).
In sum, our model predicts that the increase in costs and returns to schooling have led to a rise
in borrowing from both the GSL and private lenders. The model further predicts what while more
youth have become constrained, private lenders have expanded credit opportunities in response
to the higher earnings associated with a college education. These patterns are consistent with
53We can easily generate steeper ability – investment profiles for our baseline model using higher values for γ
and pi.
32
Table 4: Effects of Lending Policy Changes on Human Capital Investment (in % terms)
‘Year 2000’ Private Lending Parameters: GSL Parameters:
Baseline pi = γ = dmax = M = 15
0 7 15 .1 .3 0 50, 000
hG+L(a1, w):
w = PE(a1) 48,239 -12.6 -12.6 19.5 -12.6 34.1 -86.7 34.1 34.1
w = 50, 000 64,702 -34.8 -11.0 0.0 -25.3 0.0 -61.8 0.0 0.0
w = 80, 000 64,702 -9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.2 0.0 0.0
w = 100, 000 64,702 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
hG+L(a2, w):
w = PE(a2) 84,529 -41.0 0.0 0.0 -10.5 0.0 -36.6 0.0 0.0
w = 80, 000 84,529 -31.8 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -25.9 0.0 0.0
w = 100, 000 84,529 -5.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
w = 120, 000 84,529 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
hG+L(a3, w):
w = PE(a3) 99,966 -48.0 -10.0 11.7 -21.0 15.5 -41.9 15.5 15.5
w = 80, 000 104,485 -46.5 -9.7 10.5 -20.3 10.5 -40.1 10.5 10.5
w = 100, 000 115,447 -32.4 0.0 0.0 -6.8 0.0 -23.6 0.0 0.0
w = 120, 000 115,447 -13.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3 0.0 0.0
hG+L(a4, w):
w = PE(a4) 102,213 -50.3 -10.6 12.3 -22.1 28.2 -40.3 17.5 28.3
w = 80, 000 103,819 -49.8 -10.5 12.2 -21.9 27.9 -39.7 17.2 27.9
w = 100, 000 129,693 -43.0 -9.0 10.4 -18.8 23.9 -32.0 13.9 22.2
w = 120, 000 155,581 -38.4 -8.0 9.2 -16.8 21.3 -26.8 11.6 18.4
Notes: Unconstrained investments, hU (a), are $64,702, $84,529, $115,447, and $194,164.
the evidence on family income – college attendance patterns in the NLSY79 and NLSY97, the
increased fraction of youth constrained by upper GSL limits, and the expansion of private credit
discussed in Section 2. While the model does not necessarily deliver a strong positive relationship
between ability and schooling conditional on available resources for constrained youth, it performs
noticeably better than the exogenous constraint model.
6.2 Policy Experiments
We next consider the response of human capital investments to three types of changes in the
economy: (i) changes in the enforcement institutions underlying private lending; (ii) changes in
the extent of GSL programs; and (iii) changes in government subsidies. In all exercises, our point
of departure is the 2000s economy where some agents are constrained. We report the response for
the lowest resources available by ability (i.e. potential earnings, PE(a)), and for other levels of w.
For the lowest ability quartile, we report the results for lower values of w, because their potential
earnings are substantially lower.
33
Changes in the enforcement of private lending. Columns 2-6 of Table 4 show the
percentage change in human capital investment (relative to the 2000s economy benchmark in
column 1) for each ability quartile and different levels of available resources w. Column 2 presents
the case of pi = 0, when private lending collapses to zero and the GSL is the only source of credit.
The elimination of private lending leads to sizeable reductions in investment, as much as 50%
for bright youth from poor families. Columns 3 and 4 show that variations in pi closer to our
benchmark value of 10 years lead to more modest responses in human capital investments. Except
for the most able, a punishment period of 15 years would lead to unconstrained investments for
all wealth levels; top ability students from poor backgrounds would remain constrained but would
invest considerably more than under the benchmark. The punishment period would need to be
extended to near retirement (i.e. pi ≈ R−P ) before the most able with no familial income transfers
would be unconstrained.
The next two columns of Table 4 show that a reduction in γ to 0.1 would reduce investment
by as much as 25% for the poorest youth of different ability levels, while increasing γ to 0.3 would
lead to unconstrained investment for all but the highest ability quartile. Although the latter would
substantially increase investment among the most able (by nearly 30% for the very poor), γ needs
to rise above 0.45 before everyone is unconstrained. Of course, simultaneously increasing pi and γ
would more easily ensure unrestricted investment in human capital for everyone.
Changes in the GSL program. The remaining columns of Table 4 consider changes to
GSL programs. First consider eliminating the GSL program altogether (dmax = 0). This policy
change would severely restrict investment among the poorest and least able. However, the effects
are fairly large for all poor youth regardless of ability. Comparing these results against those with
only government lending (i.e. pi = 0) suggests that the GSL is more important for investment
among the least able, while private lending is more important for all other ability groups. This
is because contrary to the GSL, private lenders base credit directly on ability. Next, we consider
a modest expansion in the GSL program, increasing the upper limit to dmax = $50, 000. Such
a policy would disproportionately benefit the least able poor, but it would also help low income
youth of high ability. As with an increase in γ to 0.3, this GSL expansion enables unconstrained
investment for the bottom three-quarters of the ability distribution, while effects are comparatively
weaker for the most able.
The last column of Table 4 reports the impact of changing the GSL repayment period. Recall
that our baseline model allows individuals to spread their GSL re-payments over their entire
working careers. Here, we consider reducing the repayment period to 15 years after the completion
of school (see appendix C for details). This change effectively increases the cost of default by
reducing resources available for consumption during the period of exclusion from financial markets.
Interestingly, such a policy would have nearly identical effects on private lending constraints and
human capital accumulation as increasing γ to 0.3. Therefore, our baseline calibration closely
mimics a model with a shorter GSL repayment period and lower γ.
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Table 5: Response of Investment to Increasing Subsidy Rate to 1980s Level (2000s Economy)
2000s benchmark levels % Changes from benchmark
hG+L hX hG+L hX
h(a1, w):
w = PE(a1) 48, 239 49, 823 8.7 6.7
w = 50, 000 64, 702 64, 702 10.0 7.2
w = 80, 000 64, 702 64, 702 66.8 61.9
w = 100, 000 64, 702 64, 702 66.8 66.8
h(a2, w):
w = PE(a2) 84, 529 84, 529 21.1 12.2
w = 80, 000 84, 529 84, 529 32.4 22.0
w = 100, 000 84, 529 84, 529 55.7 49.9
w = 120, 000 84, 529 84, 529 55.7 55.7
h(a3, w):
w = PE(a3) 99, 966 91, 481 6.9 5.7
w = 80, 000 104, 485 95, 382 6.8 5.6
w = 100, 000 115, 447 115, 447 20.3 7.6
w = 120, 000 115, 447 115, 447 43.9 28.0
h(a4, w)
w = PE(a4): 102, 213 89, 252 7.0 5.8
w = 80, 000 103, 819 90, 625 6.9 5.8
w = 100, 000 129, 693 112, 766 6.5 5.5
w = 120, 000 155, 581 134, 984 6.3 5.3
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Response to education subsidies. Finally, consider the effects of reducing the government
subsidy rate s to its 1980s level (in our benchmark 2000s economy). As Table 5 demonstrates, a
higher subsidy rate leads to substantial increases in investment with the largest responses among
wealthier, unconstrained youth. Investment among constrained youth responds less, because they
also want to consume more while in school. Overall, a universal subsidy to investment amplifies
inequality in earnings.
Table 5 also compares the investment responses for our model (hG+L) with those for an ex-
ogenous constraint model (hX) with d0 = 70, 000. Since private credit expands with investment
in our framework, investment responses are always greater for constrained individuals than under
exogenous constraints. The main differences are for the middle ability groups, where the effects
are as much as 50% higher in our model compared to the exogenous constraint model.
With respect to the impact of these policies on welfare (not shown here), we make two remarks.
First, impacts on welfare tend to be smaller than on human capital investment, because borrowers
only benefit from the difference between the returns and costs of additional human capital. Second,
impacts on welfare (across different policies or individuals) need not correlate highly with impacts
on investment, because consumption is also an important margin of response to credit constraints.
7 Conclusions
GSL programs and private lending under limited commitment link the borrowing opportunities
of young individuals with their cognitive ability and investments in human capital. We show
that this link shapes the intertemporal trade-off between investment and consumption for those
that are credit constrained and is important for understanding college attendance and borrowing
patterns in recent decades. Most notably, the link is important for explaining the positive ability
– schooling relationship for youth from low-income families and the rapid expansion in private
student lending in recent decades. Conventional wisdom and numerous empirical studies presume
that borrowing constraints always inhibit investment; however, we show that this is not the case if
what constrains youth is the GSL’s tied-to-investment constraint (i.e. their borrowing is restricted
by their level of investment). Finally, we show that schooling is more sensitive to government
policies when credit depends on investment behavior: policies that increase schooling also expand
private credit opportunities, which further increases schooling among constrained youth.
A calibrated version of our model reinforces existing empirical findings that American youth
were not constrained during the 1980s but suggests that many youth may be constrained today.
This change is explained by rising college costs, even faster rising returns to education, and largely
unresponsive GSL programs. Consistent with the evidence, our model predicts that these forces
make family resources a more important determinant of higher education, cause more individuals
to exhaust their government borrowing opportunities, and lead to an expansion in private student
lending.
Our framework enables us to study the effects of changes in government student loan programs
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on private lending. We show that expansions of government lending are only partially offset by
reductions in private lending, so total student credit is increasing in GSL limits. In contrast,
efforts to extend GSL repayment periods lead to contractions in private lending, since they reduce
the costs associated with private loan default. These private credit responses, in turn, affect
educational investment decisions. We also study the effects of changes in private loan enforcement
or bankruptcy regulations on schooling in our framework. We show that expansions in private
loan enforcement capabilities increase human capital investment, especially among the more able,
while expansions in government credit tend to favor the least able.
Finally, our framework can serve as a natural starting point for future empirical work and
policy analysis that incorporates dimensions ignored here. An obvious next step is to introduce
uncertainty and learning about the returns to investment, opening the door to default in equilib-
rium. Default may serve as insurance against adverse outcomes, and loan contracts with private
lenders and the GSL must strike a balance between ensuring repayment and providing insurance
against unexpected outcomes. We have also abstracted from school quality and labor supply de-
cisions while in school. Both are likely to be important margins of response in the face of credit
constraints and deserve further attention. With reliable data on schooling, borrowing, earnings,
and loan repayment (an admittedly tall order), estimation of models that explicitly incorporate
government and private lending should provide important new insights on the nature of endoge-
nous borrowing constraints, who is constrained, and the effects of higher education policies and
economic changes on private credit offerings and, ultimately, individual schooling and borrowing
decisions.
Appendices
A NLSY79 and NLSY97 Data
The NLSY79 is a random survey of American youth ages 14-21 at the beginning of 1979, while the NLSY97 samples
youth ages 12-16 at the beginning of 1997.54 Since the oldest respondents in the NLSY97 recently turned age 24
in the 2004 wave of data, we analyze college attendance as of age 21 in both samples.
Individuals are considered to have attended college if they attended at least 13 years of school by the age of
21.55 For the 1979 cohort, we use average family income when youth are ages 16-17, excluding those not living
with their parents at these ages. In the NLSY97 data, we use household income and net wealth reported in 1997
(corresponding to ages 13-17), dropping individuals not living with their parents that year.56 We use AFQT as a
measure of cognitive ability. It is a composite score from four subtests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) used by the U.S. military: arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension,
and numerical operations. These tests are taken by respondents in both the NLSY79 and NLSY97 during their
teenage years as part of the survey process. We categorize individuals according to their family income, family net
54Our sample and variables are explained in detail in Belley and Lochner (2007).
55Schooling attainment by age 22 is used if it is missing or unavailable at age 21 (fewer than 10% of all respondents
in both surveys).
56Family income includes government transfers (e.g. welfare and unemployment insurance), but it does not
subtract taxes. Net wealth is the value of all assets (e.g. home and other real estate, vehicles, checking and savings,
and other financial assets) less loans and credit card debt.
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wealth (in NLSY97), and AFQT score quartiles.57
B Proofs and Other Aspects of the Two-Period Model
The set of constrained individuals. For each ability level a, the various forms of credit constraints define
a threshold wealth level below which the agent is constrained (and above which he is not). We now characterize
those thresholds.
Exogenous Constraints: The threshold wXmin (a) is defined by d
U
(
a,wXmin (a)
)
= d0, and therefore it is increasing
in a. Consumption smoothing implies that wXmin (a) ≥ hU (a)− d0 (the minimum wealth needed to finance hU (a)
given maximum borrowing) and that wXmin (a) is steeper than h
U (a) as a function of a. To see this, implicit
differentiation leads to dw
X
min(a)
da =
∂dU(a,wXmin)
∂a /
∂dU(a,wXmin)
∂w >
∂dU(a,wXmin)
∂a >
dhU (a)
da > 0.
GSL Programs: The threshold wGmin(a) ≡ max{wXmin(a), w˜min(a)}, where w˜min(a) is defined by hU (a) =
dU (a, w˜min(a)). It is increasing in a because dU (·, w) is steeper than hU (·). To see that wXmin(a) is steeper than
w˜min(a), use implicit differentiation to obtain
dw˜min(a)
da =
dwXmin(a)
da +
∂hU
∂a /
∂dU
∂w <
dwXmin(a)
da .
GSL Programs Plus Private Lenders: The threshold wG+Lmin (a) is defined by d
U
(
a,wG+Lmin (a)
)
= κaf
(
hU (a)
)
+
min
{
hU (a) , dmax
}
. An instructive special case is when dmax = 0 and only private lending is available in the
economy. In this case, the threshold wLmin(a) is defined by d
U (a,wLmin(a)) = κaf
[
hU (a)
]
, which increases at a
slower rate in a than does wXmin(a). Indeed, w
L
min(a) may even be decreasing in a if κ is large enough. Both of these
facts can be seen from dw
L
min
da =
dwXmin
da + κ
(
f(hU ) +R∂h
U
∂a
)
/∂d
U
∂w <
dwXmin
da because
∂dU
∂w < 0. In the general case
when both private and GSL credit is available, direct inspection reveals that wG+Lmin (a) < min
{
wGmin(a), w
L
min(a)
}
.
As with wLmin(a), the threshold w
G+L
min (a) can be decreasing in a and may even be negative.
Proof of Lemma 1. Implicit differentiation of (4) yields dh
U (a)
da = − f
′[hU (a)]
af ′′[hU (a)] > 0. Using expression (5),
define
F ≡ u′ [w + d− hU (a)]− βRu′ [af [hU (a)]−Rd] = 0.
From the implicit function theorem ∂d
U (a,w)
∂a = −∂F∂a /∂F∂d , then
∂dU (a,w)
∂a
=
∂hU (a)
∂a
+ βR
u′′
[
af
[
hU (a)
]−Rd] f [hU (a)]
u′′ [w + d− hU (a)] + βR2u′′ [af [hU (a)]−Rd] >
∂hU (a)
∂a
> 0,
where we have used af ′
[
hU (a)
]
= R. Similarly,
∂dU (a,w)
∂w
= − u
′′ [w + d− hU (a)]
u′′ [w + d− hU (a)] + βR2u′′ [af [hU (a)]−Rd] = −
1
1 + βR2 u
′′[af [hU (a)]−Rd]
u′′[w+d−hU (a)]
.
Since the denominator is greater than one, the argument is complete. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. From the FOC define
F ≡ −u′ (w + d0 − h) + βaf ′ [h]u′ [af (h)−Rd0] = 0.
The second order condition implies ∂F/∂h < 0, which, combined with implicit differentiation, implies that
sign
{
∂h
∂w
}
= sign
{
∂F
∂w
}
and sign
{
∂h
∂a
}
= sign
{
∂F
∂a
}
. First, we have ∂h∂w > 0 since
∂F
∂w = −u′′ (w + d0 − h) > 0.
Second,
∂F
∂a
= βf ′ [h]u′ [af (h)−Rd0]
{
1 + af (h)
u′′ [af (h)−Rd0]
u′ [af (h)−Rd0]
}
< βf ′ [h]u′ [af (h)−Rd0] {1− 1/η [af (h)−Rd0]} ,
57Since AFQT percentile scores increase with age in the NLSY79, we determine an individual’s quartile based
on year of birth. AFQT percentile scores in the NLSY97 have already been adjusted to account for age differences.
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where the first results from direct derivation, and the second from u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, f ′ > 0, d0 ≥ 0, and the definition
of IES≡ η (·). If η (c) ≤ 1 ∀ c > 0, the right-hand-side (RHS) of the last line is non-positive and ∂F∂a < 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the FOC for the exogenous constraint model,
aˆ (w) ≡ sup {aˆ : u′ (w) ≥ βaˆf ′ [dmax]u′ [aˆf (dmax)−Rdmax]} ,
which in principle could be +∞. If u (c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ), then aˆ (w) is finite and given by aˆ : w (βf ′ [dmax])
1
σ =
(aˆ)
σ−1
σ f (dmax) − Rdmax (aˆ)
−1
σ . If σ > 1 (IES < 1 ), the RHS is strictly increasing and unbounded, so aˆ (w) is
finite. The rest is direct upon examination of optimality conditions under the three different cases. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (i) is from direct inspection based on the thresholds as derived above. For part
(ii), use the FOC for a constrained person with a > a¯ (i.e. dg = dmax, dp = κaf (h) and h > dmax) to define
F (h, dmax, κ) ≡ (κaf ′ (h)− 1)u′ [w + dmax + κaf [h]− h] + βaf ′ (h) (1− κR)u′ [af (h) (1− κR)−Rdmax] .
For constrained agents, with a > a¯, we have that u′(c0) > βRu′(c1) and af ′(h) < R. It is straightforward to verify
that ∂F∂dmax > 0, and
∂F
∂κ > 0, and therefore, implicit differentiation implies the state results.¥
Proof Proposition 3. Part (1): If a > a¯, the FOC is given by
F = u′ (c0)
[
κaf ′ (h)−1]+βu′ (c1) af ′ (h) (1− κR)= 0,
where c0 = w+κaf (h)+dmax−h and c1 = af (h) (1− κR)−Rdmax. Moreover, notice that ∂c0∂h = κaf ′ (h)−1 < 0,
and ∂c1∂h = af
′ (h) (1− κR)> 0. To prove (i) notice that if the agent is constrained, then u′ (c0)> βRu′ (c1).
Therefore, F = 0 implies
[
1− κaf ′ (h)] < af ′(h)R (1− κR) =⇒ af ′ (h)> R, i.e. there is under-investment. To
prove (ii), notice that sign
{
dh
dw
}
= sign
{
dF
dw
}
and that dF/dw = u′′ (c0)
[
κaf ′ (h)−1]> 0. To prove (iii), first
define for any a ≥ a¯ and h ≥ dmax the fraction of labor earnings needed to pay back the maximum debt from the
GSL: % (a, h)≡Rdmaxaf(h) = % (a) f(dmax)f(h) , where %(a) is defined in the text. Next, compute the derivative, re-group,
simplify, and use the definition of η (·) and % (a, h)
∂F
∂a
= u′ (c0)κf ′ (h)+
(
1− κaf ′ (h)) [−u′′ (c0)]κf (h)+ (1− κR)βf ′ (h)u′ (c1) [1− 1
η (c1)
1
1− % (a, h)
]
. (19)
Since the agent is constrained, we have that u′ (c0)≥ βRu′ (c1). Using this inequality in the first term and ignoring
the second term because it is always positive, obtain
∂F
∂a
≥ βu′ (c1) f ′ (h)
(
Rκ+(1− κR)
[
1− 1
η (c1)
1
1− % (a, h)
])
.
The RHS is positive when η (c1) > 1−κR1−%(a,h) , which is stated as sufficient condition (a). Next, impose sufficient
condition (b) on dFda in equation (19). Since βR ≤ 1, we have c0< c1 and u′ (c0)≥ u′ (c1). Take u′ (c1) f ′ (h)> 0 as
a common factor, and in the second term use the FOC implied equality u′ (c1) =
(1−κaf ′(h))
β(1−κR)af ′(h)u
′ (c0). Also, divide
and multiply by c0 and simplify to obtain:
∂F
∂a
= u′ (c1) f ′ (h)
κu′ (c0)u′ (c1)+κ
(
1− κaf ′ (h)) f (h)
f ′ (h)
−c0u′′ (c0)
c0
(1−κaf ′(h))u′(c0)
β(1−κR)af ′(h)
+β (1− κR)
(
1− 1
η (c1) [1− % (a, h)]
) ,
≥ u′ (c1) f ′ (h)
{
κ+
κβ
η (c0)
1
1− % (a, h)+β (1− κR)
[
1− 1
η (c1) [1− % (a, h)]
]}
,
where the second line uses the definition of % (a, h), the fact that c1 ≥ c0 and that u′ (c0)≥ u′ (c1). Finally, since
by assumption η (·) is increasing,
∂F
∂a
≥ u′ (c1) f ′ (h)
{
κ+
κβ
η (c0)
1
1− % (a, h)+β (1− κR)
[
1− 1
η (c0) [1− % (a, h)]
]}
.
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This inequality holds whenever the term inside brackets is positive, which holds if η (c0) ≥ 11−%(a,h) 1−κ(R+1)1+κ(β−1−R) .
Since % (a, h) ≤ % (a), the sufficiency of condition (b) follows.
Part (2): The FOC in this case is given by
F ≡ u′ (c0)κaf ′ (h)+βu′ (c1) [af ′ (h) (1− κR)−R] = 0,
where c0= w + κaf (h) and c1= af (h) (1− κR)−Rh. To prove (i) notice that if the agent is constrained, then
u′ (c0)> βRu′ (c1) and F = 0 implies that κaf ′ (h) <
R−af ′(h)(1−κR)
R . Re-arranging, we get af
′ (h)< R, or equiv-
alently h > hU (a) because of the strict concavity of f (·). To prove (ii), compute dFdw= κaf ′ (h)u′′ (c0)< 0. The
result follows from implicit differentiation (∂h
G+L(a,w)
∂w = −∂F/∂w∂F/∂h ) and the second order condition (∂F/∂h < 0).
Similarly, for (iii) sign
{
∂hG+L(a,w)
∂a
}
= sign
{
∂F
∂a
}
. First, compute the derivative
∂F
∂a
= u′ (c0)κf ′ (h)+κaf ′ (h)u′′ (c0)
∂c0
∂a
+βu′ (c1) [f ′ (h) (1− κR)]+β [af ′ (h) (1− κR)−R]u′′ (c1) ∂c1
∂a
.
Notice that only the second term in this expression can be negative. Take 1a as a common factor and then add and
subtract Rβu′ (c1) to get:
∂F
∂a
=
1
a
{
u′ (c0)κaf ′ (h)+βu′ (c1)
[
af ′ (h) (1− κR)−R]}
+ 1a
{
Rβu′ (c1)+κaf ′ (h)u′′ (c0) ∂c0∂a a+ β
[
af ′ (h) (1− κR)−R]u′′ (c1) ∂c1∂a a} .
The FOC implies that the first line equals zero. Take Rβu′ (c1) as common factor and multiply and divide the
second term by u′ (c0):
∂F
∂a
=
Rβu′ (c1)
a
{
1+
1
R
(
u′ (c0)κaf ′ (h)
βu′ (c1)
)
u′′ (c0)
u′ (c0)
∂c0
∂a
a+
1
R
[
af ′ (h) (1− κR)−R] u′′ (c1)
u′ (c1)
∂c1
∂a
a
}
.
Because of the FOC, the expression inside parentheses in the second term equals
[
R− af ′ (h) (1− κR)]. After
dividing and multiplying the last two terms by c0 and c1, respectively, and using the definition of the IES, η (ci) ≡
− ciu′′(ci)u′(ci) and re-grouping:
∂F
∂a
=
Rβu′ (c1)
a
{
1+
[
1− af
′ (h)
R
(1− κR)
] [
1
η (c1)
(
∂c1
∂a
a
c1
)
− 1
η (c0)
(
∂c0
∂a
a
c0
)]}
.
The term 1− af ′(h)R (1− κR) > 0, since there is over-investment, i.e. af ′ (h) < R. Therefore, ∂F∂a can only be negative
if 1η(c1)
(
∂c1
∂a
a
c1
)
− 1η(c0)
(
∂c0
∂a
a
c0
)
. However, notice that since ∂c1∂a
a
c1
= af(h)(1−κR)af(h)(1−κR)−Rh > 1 and
∂c0
∂a
a
c0
= κaf(h)w+κaf(h) < 1,
this possibility is ruled out if η (c1) ≤ η (c0), which clearly holds if η (·) is constant. ¥
C Proofs and Other Aspects of the Quantitative Model
Thresholds. LetmU (a) ≡ Φ[P,R]a
[
hU (a)
]α Θ[S,P ]
Θ[S,T ]
+er(P−S) Θ[P,T ]Θ[S,T ] h
U
I (a). Then, d
U (a,w)= mU (a)−er(P−S)Θ[P,T ]/Θ[S,T ]w,
and:
wX (a)≡ e−r(P−S)Θ[S,T ]
Θ[P,T ]
[
mU (a)− dmax
]
,
wL (a)≡ e−r(P−S)Θ[S,T ]
Θ[P,T ]
[
mU (a)−κLΦ[P,R]a
[
hU (a)
]α]
,
wG (a) ≡ e−r(P−S)Θ[S,T ]
Θ[P,T ]
[
mU (a)−min
{
er(P−S)hU (a) , dmax
}]
.
For our baseline model:
wG+L (a) ≡ e−r(P−S)Θ[S,T ]
Θ[P,T ]
[
mU (a)−κ1Φ[P,R]a
[
hU (a)
]α−κ2dmax] .
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Derivation of the Credit Constraints. A non-defaulting individual retains access to formal credit markets,
is able to optimally smooth consumption, and attains post-graduation lifetime utility:
V RP
(
a, h, dg, dp
)
= Θ[P,T ]
{[
Φ[P,R]ah
α−dg−dp
]
/Θ[P,T ]
}1−σ
1− σ . (20)
On the other hand, by defaulting on any private debt dp, this individual would attain utility:
V DP (a, h, dg, r(·; dg))=
∫ P+pi
P
e−ρ(t−P )
[
(1− γ) ahαE (t− P )− r (t; dg)]1−σ
1− σ dt
+e−ρpiΘ[P+pi,T ]
{[
Φ[P+pi,R]ah
α − erpi (dg−R (P + pi, dg))] /Θ[P+pi,T ]}1−σ
1− σ , (21)
where R (P + pi, dg) =
∫ P+pi
P
e−r(t−P )r (t; dg) dt is the cumulative re-payments to GSL debt dg from P to P + pi.
The first term is the discounted utility during the punishment period and the second the discounted utility post-
punishment (when the individual has a fresh start and can fully smooth consumption).
Assume that for a period equal to or longer than the length of default punishment pi, repayments to GSL
loans are given by r (t, dg) = δahαE (t− P ), i.e. the individual must pay a constant fraction of his earnings.58
Then, R (P + pi, dg) = δΦ[P,P+pi]ahα and the post-punishment balance of GSL debt is erpi
(
dg − δΦ[P,P+pi]ahα
)
.
Even under this restriction, we can investigate the interaction between the pace of repayments of GSL loans with
repayment incentives and credit constraints of private debt. At one extreme is the “fastest” repayment case when
δ = δfast = dg/
(
Φ[P,P+pi]ahα
)
and all GSL debt must be repaid during the punishment period. This is the most
disruptive case and is only relevant if earnings are high enough to cover the debt and leave positive consumption
during the punishment period (i.e. dg/Φ[P,P+pi]ahα < 1− γ). The attainable utility of a defaulting individual is
V DP (a, h, dg, δfast) = ∆
[
(1− γ) ahα−dg/Φ[P,P+pi]
]1−σ
1− σ +e
−ρpi (Θ[P+pi,T ])σ [Φ[P+pi,R]ahα]1−σ1− σ ,
where ∆ ≡ ∫ P+pi
P
e−ρ(t−P )E (t− P )1−σ dt. At the opposite extreme is the case of “slowest” repayment in which no
repayment is made while the individual is being punished, i.e. δ = δslow = 0. All GSL debt is rolled-over to the post-
punishment period, leading to a balance of erpidg at time P +pi. This case is relevant only if Φ[P+pi,R]ahα > erpidg.
It leads to utility
V DP (a, h, dg, δslow) = ∆
[(1− γ) ahα]1−σ
1− σ +e
−ρpi (Θ[P+pi,T ])σ [Φ[P+pi,R]ahα−erpidg]1−σ1− σ ,
which, in general, is higher than V DP (a, h, dg, δfast), because repayments are scheduled in a way that minimizes the
disruption of consumption smoothing.
In general, for intermediate values of δ, we can use (21) with the condition V R ≥ V D to obtain a closed form
for the constraint on private credit:
dp≤ Φ[P,R]ahα−dg−
[
M0 (ahα)
1−σ +M1 (M2ahα−erpidg)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
,
with M0≡ ∆[1− γ − δ]1−σ /
(
Θ[P,T ]
)σ, M1≡ e−ρpi (Θ[P+pi,T ]Θ[P,T ] )σ, and M2≡ Φ[P+pi,R]+erpiδΦ[P,P+pi]. Clearly, private
debt limits are positively linked to post-school earnings Φ[P,R]ah
α and negatively linked to the amount of GSL
debt dg. However, as expected from its superior enforcement, GSL debt does not lead to a one-to-one reduction in
the capacity to borrow from private lenders as captured by the fact that the CES term in the right-hand-side is
negatively related to dg. Thus, in general, an expansion of the GSL credit limit dmax leads to an overall expansion
in available credit.
58Given our assumptions, the timing and structure of repayments does not matter if the agent does not default.
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For our baseline case, we set δ = δ∗≡ (1− γ) e
rpi(dg−δΦ[P,P+pi]ahα)
Φ[P+pi,R]ah
α . In this case, the fraction (1− γ − δ∗)
of income (net of garnishments) available to consume during the punishment period is equal to the fraction
Φ[P+pi,R]ah
α−erpi(dg−δΦ[P,P+pi]ahα)
Φ[P+pi,R]ah
α of the present value of labor earnings (net of GSL debt payments) available for
consumption during the post-punishment periods. Imposing this equality, we can write
V DP (a, h, dg, δ
∗) =∆
[
(1− γ)
(
ahα − dgΦ[P,R]−γΦ[P,P+pi]
)]1−σ
1− σ +e
−ρpi (Θ[P+pi,T ])σ
[
Φ[P+pi,R]
(
ahα − dgΦ[P,R]−γΦ[P,P+pi]
)]1−σ
1− σ ,
Define ΘD≡ ∆(1− γ)1−σ +e−ρpi
[
Θ[P+pi,T ]
Φ[P+pi,R]
]σ
Φ[P+pi,R] and factorize
[
ahα− dg[
Φy(P,R)−γΦy(P,P+pi)
]]1−σ, then
V DP (a, h, dg, δ
∗) = ΘD
[
ahα − dg[Φ[P,R]−γΦ[P,P+pi]]
]1−σ
1− σ .
This expression and the condition V R≥ V D leads to the formula dp≤ κ1Φ(P,R)ahα+κ2dg in the text, where
κ1≡ 1−
Θ[P,T ]
Φ[P,R]
(
ΘD
Θ[P,T ]
) 1
1−σ
and κ2=
(
ΘD
Θ[P,T ]
) 1
1−σ Θ[P,T ]
Φ[P,R]−γΦ[P,P+pi]
−1.
Direct inspection of these formulas verifies that 0 ≤ κ1≤ 1, κ2> −1, as well as the other properties stated in the
text. Finally, when GSL loans must repaid within [P,Q] for pi < Q < P , the private credit constraint becomes
dp≤ ΦP,Rahα−dg−
(
∆
[ΘP,T ]
σ
[
(1− γ) ahα− dg
ΦP,Q
]1−σ
+ e−ρpi
[
ΘP+pi,T
ΘP,T
]σ [
ΦP+pi,Rahα−erpi
(
1−ΦP,P+pi
ΦP,Q
)
dg
]1−σ) 11−σ
.
In the text, we consider M ≡ Q− pi = 15.
Proof Proposition 4. All three items in Part 1 and items (i) and (ii) of Part 2 follow virtually the same
lines as in Proposition 3 of the two-period case. We proceed to prove item (iii). Our case of interest is when
a > a¯, and h > h∗ ≡ h0 + (1 + s) dmax =
[
α (1 + s) a¯e−r(P−S)Φ[P,R]
] 1
1−α . In this case, if the individual is
constrained, then dg = dmax and dp = κ1Φ[P,R]ahα + κ2dmax. As in the two-period model, for a > a¯ and
h > h∗, define % (a, h) as the fraction of life-time labor earnings an individual must pay to cover the maximum
debt from the GSL, % (a, h) ≡ dmaxΦ[P,R]ahα ≤ % (a) ≤
αe−r(P−S)
1+
h0
(1+s)dmax
< α < 1. To keep notation manageable, define C0 =(
w + e−r(P−S)
[
κ1Φ[P,R]ahα + (κ2 + 1) dmax
]− hI) /Θ[S,P ] and C1 = (Φ[P,R]ahα (1− κ1)− (κ2 + 1) dmax) /Θ[P,T ].
The problem for a constrained agent is entirely in terms of hI :
max
{hI}
Θ[S,P ]
[C0]
1−σ
1− σ + e
−ρ(P−S)Θ[P,T ]
[C1]
1−σ
1− σ .
Since a > a¯, the solution is interior and given by the FOC
F ≡ C−σ0
[
ακ1Φ[P,R]ahα−1 (1 + s)− 1
]
e−r(P−S) + e−ρ(P−S)C−σ1 αΦ[P,R]ah
α−1 (1− κ1) (1 + s) = 0.
As before, the relationship between ability and investment is given by dFda , which is:
∂F
∂a
= C−σ0
[
ακ1Φ[P,R]hα−1
]
e−r(P−S) (1 + s)− σC−(σ+1)0
[
ακ1Φ[P,R]ahα−1 (1 + s)− 1
]
e−r(P−S)
∂C0
∂a
+ e−ρ(P−S)C−σ1 αΦ[P,R]h
α−1 (1− κ1) (1 + s)− σe−ρ(P−S)C−σ−11 αΦ[P,R]ahα−1 (1− κ1) (1 + s)
∂C1
∂a
.
Using F=0 and factorizing Ψ ≡ e−ρ(P−S)C−σ1 αΦ[P,R]hα−1 (1− κ1) (1 + s) > 0,
∂F
∂a
= Ψ
{[
C1
C0
]σ
e(ρ−r)(P−S)
κ1
1− κ1 + σ
∂C0
∂a
a
C1
C1
C0
+ 1− σ∂C1
∂a
a
C1
}
,
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where the second term has been multiplied and divided by C1. Since the individual is constrained, C1/C0 >
e[
r−ρ
σ ](P−S) and (C1/C0)
σ
> e[r−ρ](P−S). Using these inequalities in the second and first term, respectively, and
then simplifying:
∂F
∂a
> Ψ
{
1
1− κ1 + σ
(
e[
r−ρ
σ ](P−S) ∂C0
∂a
a
C1
− ∂C1
∂a
a
C1
)}
.
Using the definitions of C0 and C1, compute ∂C0∂a
a
C1
= Θ[P,T ]Θ[S,P ]
κ1e
−r(P−S)
[1−κ1−(κ2+1)%(a,h)] and
∂C1
∂a
a
C1
= 1−κ1[1−κ1−(κ2+1)%(a,h)] .
Plug these expressions in and simplify to obtain
∂F
∂a
> Ψ
 1
1− κ1 +
σ
(
κ1
Θ[S,T ]
Θ[S,P ]
− 1
)
[1− κ1 − (κ2 + 1) % (a, h)]
 .
The RHS is positive iff
σ
(
κ1
Θ[S,T ]
Θ[S,P ]
− 1
)
≥ − [1− κ1 − (κ2 + 1) % (a, h)]
1− κ1 , (22)
which holds if κ1 ≥ Θ[S,P ]Θ[S,T ] , i.e. sufficient condition (a), because by construction 1−κ1−(κ2 + 1) % (a, h) > 0 when a >
a¯ and h > h∗. If κ1
(
Θ[S,T ]
Θ[S,P ]
)
< 1, dividing both sides of (22) by it leads to σ ≤
[
1− (κ2+1)1−κ1 % (a, h)
] [
1− κ1 Θ[S,T ]Θ[S,P ]
]−1
.
The claim for sufficient condition (b) holds because % (a, h) ≤ % (a). ¥
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Table D1: Total Schooling Costs for each year of college by AFQT Quartile (1999 Dollars)
Years of Direct 
College Expenditures Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
1 6,322 3,604 8,560 6,716 6,841 9,927 14,882 13,038 13,163
2 12,343 8,689 19,446 17,530 15,476 21,032 31,789 29,873 27,819
3 58,275 14,844 30,467 29,257 26,288 73,119 88,742 87,532 84,563
4 75,880 21,222 40,825 40,350 39,106 97,102 116,704 116,229 114,985
5 92,646 26,606 51,201 51,232 51,300 119,252 143,847 143,878 143,947
6 108,615 31,799 60,135 60,509 61,431 140,413 168,750 169,124 170,045
7 123,822 35,531 67,669 69,302 70,733 159,354 191,491 193,125 194,555
8 138,306 36,243 72,981 76,520 78,758 174,549 211,287 214,826 217,064
Notes:
Foregone Earnings: Total Costs:
1) Direct expenditures based on average expenditures per student in all colleges and universities.  Expenditures for first 
two years of college are based on 2-yr school averages for school years 1980-81 to 1984-85.  Expenditures for grades 
15+ are based on 4-yr school averages for school years 1980-81 to 1989-90.  Costs are discounted at a 5% annual 
interest rate back to grade 12.   (Source: Digest of Education Statistics, Table 342, 1999.)
2) Foregone earnings reflect the PV of average earnings relative to someone with 12 years of completed schooling, 
taking into account  earnings during college.  See text for details.
